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THE WORKERS’ CONSTITUTION 
Luke Norris* 
 
This Article argues that the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Social 
Security Act of 1935, and Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 should be 
understood as a “workers’ constitution.”  The Article tells the history of how 
a connected wave of social movements responded to the insecurity that wage 
earners faced after the Industrial Revolution and Great Depression by 
working with government officials to bring about federal collective 
bargaining rights, wage and hour legislation, and social security legislation.  
It argues that the statutes are tied together as a set of “small c” constitutional 
commitments in both their histories and theory.  Each statute sought to 
redefine economic freedom for workers around security and sought to 
position worker security as essential to the constitutional accommodation of 
corporate capitalism.  The Article also explores the interpretive implications 
of conceiving of a “workers’ constitution” in the current context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Across the legal landscape today, the federal laws that once protected 
workers’ rights are unraveling in important ways.  Workers face mounting 
hurdles to bargaining collectively, and unionization levels have dipped to an 
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all-time low,1 with effects on income inequality and insecurity.2  Workers 
have less job security, and increasingly their relationships with firms are 
being defined so as to unbundle the protections afforded by law.3  The future 
and strength of social security are in peril, and social security fails to offer 
the old-age and unemployment security it once delivered.4  The federal 
minimum wage has been stagnant for some time, and workers in the gig 
economy are increasingly categorized so as to fall outside of its protections.5  
And courts are increasingly using the First Amendment to fashion “neo-
Lochnerian” doctrines that further weaken worker protections in the name of 
corporate or individual opt-out rights.6  At the same time, new rights 
movements have formed to strengthen social insurance,7 raise the minimum 
wage,8 and to find novel ways to provide workers with representation and 
protection in the global economy.9 
 
 1. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, A Positive Right to Free Labor, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
859, 892–93 (2016) (“Union density in the United States has declined to an all-time low.”).  
See generally SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE 
NEW RIGHT (2014). 
 2. See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, The Cost of a Decline in Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/opinion/nicholas-kristof-the-cost-of-a-decline-
in-unions.html [https://perma.cc/Q4Y5-BTEU]. 
 3. See generally, e.g., KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:  
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004); DAVID WEIL, THE 
FISSURED WORKPLACE:  WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE 
TO IMPROVE IT (2014). 
 4. See, e.g., ANNE L. ALSTOTT, A NEW DEAL FOR OLD AGE:  TOWARD A PROGRESSIVE 
RETIREMENT (2016); Steve Benen, Social Security Faces Threat from ‘Ideological War,’ 
MSNBC (Feb. 12, 2015, 12:36 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/social-
security-faces-threat-ideological-war [https://perma.cc/35DH-SW2B]. 
 5. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, How the $15 Minimum Wage Went from Laughable to 
Viable, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/sunday-review/how-
the-15-minimum-wage-went-from-laughable-to-viable.html [http://perma.cc/H2YM-kHAL]. 
 6. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public 
Accommodation Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1233 (2014); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early 
Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1917–18 (2016); Elizabeth 
Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1453 (2015); Tim Wu, The 
Right to Evade Regulation, NEW REPUBLIC (June 3, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/ 
113294/how-corporations-hijacked-first-amendment-evade-regulation [https://perma.cc/ 
3T35-4ULU].  For an account of the U.S. Supreme Court’s neoliberal approach, see David 
Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626 (2014), and see also David 
Singh Grewal & Jedidiah Purdy, Introduction:  Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1 (2014). 
 7. See, e.g., Mark Miller, Calls for Social Security Expansion Grow Louder in 
Washington, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/your-money/ 
calls-for-social-security-expansion-grow-louder-in-washington.html [https://perma.cc/B2T5-
42JT]. 
 8. See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, It’s Not Just Fast Food:  The Fight for $15 Is for Everyone 
Now, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/ 
12/04/its-not-just-fast-food-the-fight-for-15-is-for-everyone-now/ [https://perma.cc/79YK-
T3ZD]. 
 9. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM:  THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 166 (1993).  See generally Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s 
Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1591 (2016); Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union:  Politics 
Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148 (2013). 
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All of the challenged legal regimes described above—which provide 
workers with collective bargaining rights, unemployment insurance, and the 
minimum wage—were established during the New Deal.  Indeed, New Deal 
worker legislation has an important constitutional lineage.  The legislation 
was seen by many citizens and government officials as creating new rights 
and was won during a constitutional battle over Congress’s regulatory 
authority.10  Today, the unraveling of those commitments and the related 
arrival of what some call a “Second Gilded Age” of vast economic inequality 
and insecurity has drawn many scholars back toward thinking about the 
relationship between constitutional law and economic ordering—and, as a 
result, inevitably back toward the New Deal.11 
The New Deal is a foundational moment that established the architecture 
of federal economic regulation.  In this Article, I argue that we should 
understand a core part of it differently.  I recreate a significant part of the 
New Deal constitutional transformation from the bottom up, exploring how 
an interconnected set of movements engaged with political leaders in the 
process of enacting the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA),12 
which provided workers with collective bargaining rights; the Social Security 
Act of 1935 (SSA),13 which provided workers with unemployment and old-
age insurance; and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),14 which 
established federal minimum wage and hour guarantees.  I argue that the 
statutes were connected in their histories and in their conjoined effort to 
provide workers with economic security rights and have become part of the 
constitutive “web of practices, institutions, norms, and traditions that 
structure American society,”15 sometimes called “small c” constitutional 
commitments.  While legal scholars have explored separately the histories of 
the NLRA and SSA, and have paid comparatively less attention to the FLSA, 
this Article both tells different stories of the statutes’ enactment16 and is the 
first to capture the fuller history of the three statutes’ connection and 
significance.17 
While acknowledging the ossification and withering of these statutes 
today, most of the Article is dedicated to telling the histories of their 
 
 10. See infra Parts I.A, II–IV. 
 11. See infra notes 19, 440.  This literature is sometimes called a “constitutional political 
economy” literature. See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional 
Political Economy:  An Introduction to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic 
Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2016) (“[A]rguments about constitutional political 
economy begin from the premises that economics and politics are inextricable and that our 
constitutional order rests on and presupposes a political-economic order.”). 
 12. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 
(2012)). 
 13. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 14. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 
(2012)). 
 15. Andrias, supra note 9, at 1596; see also Richard Primus, Unbundling 
Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (2013); infra Part V.B. 
 16. See infra note 42 (NLRA); infra notes 162–64 (SSA); infra note 21 (FLSA). 
 17. See infra note 21. 
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enactment in order to breathe new life into how legal scholars understand 
their foundations and purpose.  Along the way, I make several arguments.  
First, I argue that the statutes are historically connected in part by the 
overlapping social movements that were involved in their enactment.  
Drawing on social movement theory, I argue that the statutes were produced 
by a “wave of mobilization” characterized by overlapping and linked 
movements struggling for worker security.  Second, I argue that the statutes 
are historically connected as responses to conditions of economic insecurity 
for wage earners that the forces behind their enactment believed were 
constitutionally impermissible.  Third, I argue that the statutes are connected 
at the level of theory because each seeks to redefine economic freedom for 
workers around security and to tie security to citizenship.  Fourth, I argue 
that each statute has settled into the constitutional fabric and has become a 
“small c” constitutional commitment.18  Finally, I argue that the statutes are 
best understood as a set of connected “small c” constitutional commitments:  
together, a “workers’ constitution.” 
This Article proceeds in five Parts.  In Part I, I lay the foundations for the 
history that follows, foregrounding the economic context from which the 
statutes arose and the wave of connected movements that pushed for their 
enactment.  In Parts II, III, and IV, I explore the rise and constitutional status 
of, respectively, the NLRA, SSA, and FLSA.  In Part V, I turn to considering 
some implications of this historical recasting.  In the Conclusion, I briefly 
situate this Article in debates about today’s rising levels of economic 
inequality produced in part by the withering and ossification of the workers’ 
constitution.19 
 
 18. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:  THE 
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 29–74, 171–208 (2010) (assessing how “super-statutes,” 
including the Social Security Act of 1935, have established “small-c” constitutional rights).  
Jack Balkin refers to statutes that fulfil constitutional purposes as “constitutional 
constructions.” See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 113–14, 300–10 (2011).  Bruce 
Ackerman, in his account of “constitutional moments,” also references “landmark statutes.” 
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742 (2007).  I 
argue that the statutes are “super-statutes” in Part V.B below, but they would also qualify as 
constitutional constructions or landmark statutes. 
 19. See, e.g., GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION:  
WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC (2017); K. Sabeel Rahman, 
Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age:  
Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (2016); Ganesh Sitaraman, 
The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 
1445 (2016); see also Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 11, at 1290. 
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I.  NEW DEAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Rather than taking on the incredibly generative New Deal writ large,20 or 
analyzing its statutes one-by-one,21 in this Part I explore how a connected set 
of movements and legislators sought to win new rights of economic security 
 
 20. Among legal scholars, Bruce Ackerman perhaps best epitomizes this approach.  
Ackerman argues that through a multistep process—signaling, proposing, triggering, 
ratifying, and consolidating—FDR gained the authority to speak on behalf of “We, the People” 
in creating a federal government that would intervene in the economy. See 1 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS ch. 5 (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE:  TRANSFORMATIONS pt. III (1998).  He references the NLRA and SSA as signature 
achievements of the era, but he does not recount their histories. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra, at 
391; Ackerman, supra note 18, at 1761.  In some ways, this height becomes a disadvantage to 
a bird’s-eye level approach and limits from view the richer histories of the New Deal.  
Ackerman, for example, must explain policies as ranging as the Securities and Exchange Acts 
of 1933, the NLRA, the Public Utility Holdings Act, the repudiation of the gold standard, and 
so on. See, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra, at 256–71. 
 21. Scholars have produced rich accounts of the history of the NLRA. See, e.g., Mark 
Barenberg, Political Economy of the Wagner Act:  Power, Symbol, and Workplace 
Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV 1379, 1392–1410 (1993); William E. Forbath, The New Deal 
Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 175 (2001); James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth 
Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause:  Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional 
Law, 1921–1959, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 59 (2002); see also WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND 
THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT ch. 1 (1991) (providing an earlier history).  
They have also produced rich accounts of the history of the SSA. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & 
FEREJOHN, supra note 18, at 171–208.  There is comparatively less focus on the FLSA in legal 
scholarship.  In a prominent recent exception, Kate Andrias explores the statute’s industry 
committees and approach to social democracy. Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social 
Democracy:  The Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616 
(2019).  Other articles engaging with the statute include, for example, Samuel R. Bagenstos, 
Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225, 263 (2013); Judith Resnik, 
Vital State Interests:  From Representative Actions for Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts, 
Class Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1780–87 (2017); 
and Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2687–91 
(2008); as well as Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act:  Racial 
Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1987); and Deborah C. Malamud, 
Engineering the Middle Classes:  Class Line-Drawing in New Deal Hours Legislation, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 2212 (1998). 
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for workers.  This Article’s approach entails both a focus on the diverse 
actors behind the statutes22 and the interconnections among them.23 
A.  The Transformation of the Economy 
The forces behind the rise of the workers’ constitution responded in large 
part to the transformation of the economy.  The relatively agrarian economy 
of the American founding had become with the Industrial Revolution an 
economy where citizens were largely wage earners, often in large corporate 
enterprises.  This transformation was thought by many social movements and 
political leaders to destabilize the constitutional system by creating vast 
economic insecurity that would bleed into the political system. 
For the founding generation, structuring the economy around agrarian 
independence created the economic conditions for sustaining self-
government.24  Granting wide access to property was thought to create a 
system of citizen-entrepreneurs—then, white males—whose economic self-
sufficiency would make them the kinds of independent persons that could 
govern themselves.25  This notion was not only linked to property enabling 
citizens to become entrepreneurs or farmers from their own land, but also, 
and equally importantly, to combating the docility and domination in webs 
of landlord-tenant governance that would bleed into politics and make 
constitutional self-government impracticable.26 
But as the nation moved from an agrarian system to an industrial system 
based on wage-earning in enterprises, the Industrial Revolution created the 
very webs of dependence that property was meant to untangle.  As the nation 
 
 22. In this way, it differs from approaches focusing largely on presidential leadership. See 
1 ACKERMAN, supra note 20, ch. 5; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 20, pt. III.  See generally CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS:  FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION—AND WHY WE 
NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2006).  Indeed, the focus on presidential leadership requires 
scholars like Ackerman to focus on presidential elections as evidence of “mandates” reflecting 
popular assent—a move that is criticized. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW 
DEAL COURT:  THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 27 (1998) (noting that “it 
is difficult to see how the Court could have construed the 1936 election as a constitutional 
referendum” in light of the fact that “Roosevelt assiduously avoided raising either the 
Constitution or the Court as an issue in his campaign”); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional 
Fact/Constitutional Fiction:  A Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional 
Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 771 (1992) (book review) (“Ackerman asserts that the 1936 
election represented a popular mandate against the Court’s constriction of the New Deal.  
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of this thesis is that Roosevelt scarcely mentioned the 
Court during the 1936 campaign.”). 
 23. Scholars who focus singularly on the NLRA or SSA do not account for the ways in 
which certain New Deal achievements together responded to the problems industrialism posed 
for workers.  Scholars pluck the statutes out of their historical context and proceed with a 
“view from nowhere” rather than a contextualized understanding of how statutes connect. Cf. 
THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986) (contrasting an objective perspective, 
detached from experience and reasoning about experiences from the outside—a “view from 
nowhere”—with a subjective perspective based on personal experience and feeling). 
 24. E.g., Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. 
L. REV. 669, 680 (2014). 
 25. ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 9 (1999). 
 26. E.g., GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 106 (Vintage 
Books ed. 1993) (1991). 
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became a country of workers in often large enterprises, the notion of 
economic freedom being embodied by atomistic and self-sufficient citizen-
entrepreneurs no longer fit economic conditions.27  In the Progressive Era 
and through the Great Depression, economic life was coming to be seen by 
many workers, movements, and political leaders as a sphere of vast 
insecurity, where citizens were powerless in bargaining with employers over 
their wages, hours, and working conditions,28 where child labor existed,29 
where job loss or old age meant material insecurity,30 and where efforts of 
workers to associate to challenge these conditions were thwarted by 
employers and courts.31  Citizens needed to work to survive, and they had 
very little control over their work lives and working conditions.32 
For many citizens and political leaders, the consequences of this new form 
of economic ordering had constitutional implications.  Economic insecurity, 
as movements and legislators argue again and again in the histories that 
unfold below, made people unfit for citizenship in our constitutional 
republic.33  Thus, with the rise of the Industrial Revolution came a new wave 
 
 27. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS:  LABOR RELATIONS, 
LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960, at 33–36, 59–95 
(1985).  As Robert Dahl put it, “The older vision of a citizen body of free farmers among 
whom an equality of resources seemed altogether possible, perhaps even inevitable, no longer 
fitted that reality of the new economic order in which economic enterprises automatically 
generated inequalities among citizens.” ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC 
DEMOCRACY 3 (1986). 
 28. See, e.g., GEORGE E. PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE FOR THE FORGOTTEN MAN:  THE QUEST 
FOR FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 1933–1941, at 16–34 (1996) (exploring workers’ difficulties in 
controlling wages and hours and in receiving legislative aid in doing so); LANDON R. Y. 
STORRS, CIVILIZING CAPITALISM:  THE NATIONAL CONSUMERS’ LEAGUE, WOMEN’S ACTIVISM, 
AND LABOR STANDARDS IN THE NEW DEAL ERA ch. 1 (2000) (exploring the fight for minimum 
wage and hour laws). 
 29. See, e.g., FLORENCE KELLEY, SOME ETHICAL GAINS THROUGH LEGISLATION ch. 1 
(1910) (exploring the phenomenon of child labor in the United States). 
 30. See infra notes 165–68 and accompanying text. 
 31. See generally, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 
(1930). 
 32. See, e.g., IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS:  A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
WORKER, 1920–1933 chs. 1–2 (1960) (surveying the conditions in mill villages where workers 
had very little power, were sometimes hired as families, worked incredibly long hours without 
adequate pay, and lived on company grounds and often company credit).  As William Forbath 
explains, this situation had been produced by “increasing concentration of ownership of 
resources and capital” during a time that would push “millions of working-class women and 
children into the factories.” William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1999).  The proprietors of these factories “demand[ed] longer and longer 
hours of ‘mindless toil,’ that deprived working[ people] of the time to educate themselves and 
participate in public affairs.” Id. at 29.  The system produced “more ‘dependence,’ more 
‘ignorance,’ and more ‘grinding poverty.’” Id. 
 33. The constitutional political economy argument tied economic freedom to citizenship 
and therefore political freedom. See generally Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 11.  Economic 
freedom in this understanding helps to create the conditions for political freedom—that is, for 
citizens to participate in self-government. See DAHL, supra note 27, at 1 (noting the American 
consensus “that a well-ordered society would require . . . political liberty . . . and economic 
liberty”); FONER, supra note 25, at 9 (noting that, since the American Revolution, it has been 
axiomatic in American constitutional thought that political freedom and a decent measure of 
economic freedom are both required). 
2019] THE WORKERS’ CONSTITUTION 1467 
of movements that sought to win workers guarantees of security and to 
redefine economic freedom for workers around security and tie economic 
security to citizenship.34 
B.  A Wave of Mobilization 
FDR’s election would be a turning point for workers’ movements.  The 
fall of 1932 commenced what social movement theorists call a “wave of 
mobilization.”35  Waves occur when movements facing similar problems see 
political openings and rise up together to capture political opportunities by 
engaging with legislators and executive branch officials on multiple yet 
related lawmaking fronts.36 
In the fall of 1932, disparate movements connected and increased their 
ambitions for a national program of economic security legislation.  The 
moment had the elements that social movement theorists associate with a 
wave.  First, the movements were responding to the political opening of 
FDR’s election with new ambitions, and second, they were crossing lines to 
come together to plan this ambitious agenda of connected worker-security 
measures; in the statutory histories below, indeed, they continue to 
intersect.37 
The movements that gathered that fall would become among the leading 
organizations behind the rise of the “workers’ constitution” in the years to 
follow.  In November of 1932, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) held 
a blockbuster convention bringing disparate movements together to call for 
 
 34. This is not to deny the earlier lineage of workers’ movements.  The labor movement, 
for example, has rich history in American life preceding the Industrial Revolution. See 
generally, e.g., TOMLINS, supra note 27, ch. 2. 
 35. By focusing on social movement theory and how movements guide constitutional law, 
my approach is nested in “democratic constitutionalism” scholarship. See, e.g., Reva Siegel & 
Robert Post, Roe Rage:  Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. 
REV. 373, 374 (2007) (defining the term).  Scholars of democratic constitutionalism focus on 
how social movements and citizens “make claims about the Constitution’s meaning” and 
engage with political figures to guide constitutional change. Id.  Drawing on social movement 
theory, democratic constitutionalists assess how movements frame constitutional struggles, 
mobilize resources, and succeed or fail in influencing courts and other constitutional 
interpreters based on structural political factors. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional 
Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH. L. REV. 877, 877–79 (2013) (reviewing 
JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION:  POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 
(2011)). 
 36. E.g., J. Craig Jenkins & Charles Perrow, Farmworkers’ Movements in Changing 
Political Contexts, in THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS READER:  CASES AND CONCEPTS 287, 297 (Jeff 
Goodwin & James M. Jasper eds., 3d ed. 2015); J. Craig Jenkins & Charles Perrow, 
Insurgency of the Powerless:  Farm Worker Movements (1946–1972), 42 AM. SOC. REV. 249 
(1977) [hereinafter Jenkins & Perrow, Insurgency].  The idea of waves of mobilization has 
Deweyian undertones:  just as Dewey theorized that “publics” would form by bringing the 
problems of everyday life to the state for collective resolution, social movement scholars show 
how movements may overlap and converge in accessing the state. See generally JOHN DEWEY, 
THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS:  AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL INQUIRY (1927). 
 37. For useful explanations of how political opportunities and movement interconnections 
structure waves of mobilization, see generally Jeff Goodin & James M. Jasper, Introduction 
to THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS READER:  CASES AND CONCEPTS, supra note 36, at 3; and Jenkins 
& Perrow, Insurgency, supra note 36. 
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and draft sweeping federal labor legislation.38  The stirrings at the conference 
would become the first sparks in the New Deal battle for the NLRA. 
Similarly, that December, the American Association for Labor Legislation 
(AALL) met in Cincinnati, bringing together labor-movement leaders, 
leaders of several prominent worker movements, star lawyers like Felix 
Frankfurter, and reformers like Frances Perkins.39  Fueled by “widespread 
interest in social justice legislation” and stirred by FDR’s call for a “new 
deal,” the AALL and the various movement representatives seized the 
moment to plan for a program of social insurance legislation—a plan that 
would lay the foundations for the SSA.40 
The National Consumers’ League (the “League”) held a similarly well-
attended conference that December, bringing together various movements 
and intellectual leaders and calling for a dramatic federal program of 
workers’ legislation:  wage and hour laws, which were the League’s bread 
and butter, but also unemployment and old-age insurance, collective 
bargaining rights, and child labor prohibitions.41 
These movements had long histories and pedigrees—the AFL had been 
around since 1886, focusing on worker collective action; the AALL since 
1905, fighting for social insurance programs of various kinds; and the League 
since 1891, leading the fight for wage and hour laws and child labor 
prohibitions.  They had been working, both independently and together, 
toward achieving victories for workers for sustained periods, making 
piecemeal progress mostly at the state level, but this was a particularly 
energetic moment both in terms of the movements’ ambitions at the federal 
level and their interconnection. 
In the following three Parts, I recreate the history of the New Deal wave 
of mobilization that helped to produce the economic security statutes.  I focus 
in each Part on the development of a movement in response to the problems 
posed by industrialism, sketching its formation and view of legislative rights 
making, and then turn to the histories of the enactment of the statutes.  
Although the movements in each history interact and overlap, the history of 
the NLRA focuses principally on the AFL; the SSA, on the relationship 
between an elderly movement, the Townsendites, and a group of mostly 
Wisconsin-based academics, which I sometimes refer to as the 
“Wisconsinites,” although they were a subset—indeed, the most powerful 
part—of the AALL; and the FLSA, on the League and various parts of the 
labor movement. 
 
 38. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 476, 481–82. 
 39. John B. Andrews, Annual Business Meeting, 23 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 60, 60–61 
(1933). 
 40. John B. Andrews, Social Justice, 22 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 115, 115 (1932). 
 41. LUCY RANDOLPH MASON, TO WIN THESE RIGHTS:  A PERSONAL STORY OF THE CIO IN 
THE SOUTH 12 (1952); STORRS, supra note 28, at 94. 
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II.  THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 
The NLRA, which would protect the right of workers to bargain 
collectively, was born of a significant engagement between movements and 
congressional leaders.  This Part first explores the labor movement’s efforts 
to define economic freedom around worker association and collective 
security.42  It then explores how the AFL played a key role in teeing up 
collective bargaining guarantees by getting them into a corporatist bill that 
would be a precursor to the NLRA—the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(the “Recovery Act”).  The Part then turns to the battle for the NLRA.  While 
strands within the AFL remained unconvinced of or opposed to governmental 
intervention along the lines of the NLRA, much of the AFL had come to 
“firmly support[]”43 the bill by the time it was introduced.  AFL leaders 
influenced core components of the final shape of the legislation, and labor-
movement pressure helped pave the way for its enactment.  Finally, this Part 
also explores how congressional leaders, along with the labor movement, 
came to define economic freedom around worker self-representation in 
unions. 
A.  Movement Development 
This Part focuses in large part on the AFL, which began to rise to 
ascendance in the 1890s.44  While the labor movement had previously made 
constitutional arguments against a system of “wage slavery” based on the 
Thirteenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions,45 the AFL at the 
time began to narrow the labor movement’s goals.46  The movement’s 
ascendancy “reflected a shift toward the judgment that workers must frankly 
accept their status as wage earners and seek higher wages and better working 
conditions” through collective bargaining.47 
As the AFL rose to prominence, concepts like “industrial freedom” and 
“industrial democracy” became central parts of both progressive and labor 
movement discourse.48  Indeed, Samuel Gompers, the AFL’s president from 
 
 42. The role of the labor movement in the lead-up to the enactment of the NLRA has been 
explored by James Gray Pope. See Pope, supra note 21, at 59.  This Part builds on his account 
by exploring in detail labor’s influence in producing the Act and in generally establishing 
collective bargaining as a federally protected norm as early as 1932.  I diverge from Pope’s 
account insofar as I do not think that Congress was as untrue to labor’s constitutional vision 
as he does and agree with William Forbath’s account in this regard. See Forbath, supra note 
21, at 175.  I also diverge from scholars who focus on Wagner and Congress and not as much 
on the labor movement in the NLRA’s construction. See generally Barenberg, supra note 21. 
 43. IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 89 (1950). 
 44. See TOMLINS, supra note 27, ch. 2. 
 45. See Forbath, supra note 32, at 18–23, 34–43; see also FONER, supra note 25, at 60; 
WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT ch. 1 
(1991). 
 46. See Forbath, supra note 32, at 59.  The AFL’s rise coincided with the decline of the 
Knights of Labor, which had organized workers across “skill, race, and ethnicity.” Id. at 58; 
see also id. at 58–59 (discussing the AFL’s racial issues and shortcomings). 
 47. FONER, supra note 25, at 135. 
 48. Id. at 141. 
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its inception through 1924, said that industrial freedom was founded upon “a 
new concept of the rights of man”49 and the “right . . . to have a voice in the 
industrial world.”50 
AFL leaders contrasted worker economic freedom through association 
with the ills of workplace domination and connected both to citizenship.  As 
Gompers declared, it was “ridiculous to imagine that wage-workers can be 
slaves in employment yet achieve control at the polls.”51  AFL President 
William Green, who would lead the movement from 1924 to 1952, similarly 
argued that worker association contributed to self-independence and 
citizenship.52  Labor leaders thus argued that political freedom was “not 
sufficient unless the wage-earner possesses an industrial equality that places 
him on a par with his employer[; until then,] there can never exist that 
freedom and liberty of action which is necessary to the maintenance of a 
republican form of government.”53  As future U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Louis Brandeis summarized labor’s argument, citizens could not be “self-
respecting members of a democracy” without “freedom in things 
industrial.”54  The possibility of “political liberty” was undermined by 
“industrial slavery.”55  As a member of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks 
wrote in the AFL’s journal, “Mere political independence was a dead letter 
unless it was accompanied by industrial independence.”56 
Despite some promising advances in the Progressive Era—including the 
passage of the Clayton Act of 1914, which declared that the “labor of a 
human being is not a commodity,”57 and spurts of organizing soon after, 
including the Era’s largest labor uprising in 1919–1920 with steel strikes 
 
 49. Samuel Gompers, President, AFL, Address to the AFL Convention at Horticulture 
Hall in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Nov. 9, 1914), in REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-
FOURTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 3 (1914). 
 50. See id.  Much of this would come through direct confrontation with the courts that 
were attempting to stand in the way of labor’s right to protest and strike. See generally, e.g., 
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 31; TOMLINS, supra note 27, ch. 3; Forbath, supra note 
32; Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 462 (2017). 
 51. SAMUEL GOMPERS, LABOR AND THE COMMON WELFARE 125 (Arno Press, Inc. reprt. 
ed. 1969) (1919). 
 52. Praise Carnegie at Founder’s Day Exercises, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE TIMES, Apr. 30, 
1926, at 1.  Green also argued that labor association would help workers reduce their hours so 
that they could have the ability to participate in community activities. Id.  A worker who has 
time away from work, he continued, “becomes a social factor and his interest in civic and 
political affairs is quickened and intensified.” Id.  “He is a force in the community, a better 
citizen and a more efficient workman,” one who has the energy to participate in constitutional 
self-government. Id. 
 53. Editorial, 40 IRON MOLDERS’ J. 750, 750 (1904), quoted in Forbath, supra note 32, at 
59. 
 54. FONER, supra note 25, at 142. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Henry F. Kirkham, Union Achievements, 38 AM. FEDERATIONIST 947, 948 (1931), 
quoted in Forbath, supra note 32, at 59. 
 57. Clayton Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 17 (2012)). 
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which, at their height, included some 365,000 workers58—the labor 
movement bled one million members during the 1920s and made few 
advances.59  During that period, workers increasingly found their efforts to 
protest and strike rebuffed by federal judges issuing injunctions that often 
interpreted their activities as conspiratorial or violent.60  The Norris-
La Guardia Act of 1932, which cabined this judicial discretion and declared 
in name a right of workers to associate,61 was a signature achievement 
removing some impediments from the way of worker association.  But the 
legislation was opposed by President Hoover, who ultimately signed it but 
sought to undermine it swiftly;62 a full collective bargaining right was not yet 
entrenched by the beginning of the New Deal. 
B.  Passing the Statute 
FDR had campaigned on a promise of leadership on the economy.  
However, a national labor policy was not being developed by the incoming 
president or Congress.  Instead, the labor movement had assumed leadership 
of the process.  The AFL turned to Congress with a bill to limit the hours of 
workers in interstate commerce.  The bill was not a collective bargaining bill, 
but the story of the deliberations around it and its ultimate failure are critical 
to understanding how the NLRA would come to be.  The compromise around 
abandoning the bill would place a collective bargaining right at the center of 
the national legislative agenda. 
1.  The Black Bill 
At its November 1932 convention in Cincinnati, the AFL decided that the 
Great Depression required a change in course from its position of opposing 
wage and hour laws out of fear that they would provide wage floors and 
ceilings.  Its executive committee drafted a bill and convinced Senator Hugo 
Black to introduce it in late December.63  The bill would limit hours and days 
for those whose work was involved in interstate commerce.  The United Mine 
Workers (UMW) also proposed setting a minimum wage, although the wage 
provisions never made it into the draft.64  During this period, the AFL and 
UMW consulted with and worked with Senator Black and other legislators. 
 
 58. See FONER, supra note 25, at 176.  For an overview of strikes during those years, see 
also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT:  THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 
1919–1933, at 41 (1957). 
 59. See FONER, supra note 25, at 179. 
 60. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 391–93; FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 
31; Norris, supra note 50. 
 61. Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–115 (2012)). 
 62. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 414. 
 63. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS:  A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
WORKER, 1933–1941, at 24 (2010). 
 64. See id.; see also Thirty-Hour Week Bill:  Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 
73d Cong. 814 (1933). 
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The House and Senate held hearings, and the AFL was the major supporter 
of the bill, working behind the scenes to gain support from members of 
Congress.65  The bill gained increasing popularity as it became clear that the 
AFL was going to be a leading force in developing a recovery program for 
workers.  As one commentator wrote that February with regard to the labor 
movement, “Any politician can testify . . . that this is not an influence to be 
ignored safely.”66  The Black bill was thus becoming “the trigger of the 
recovery program.”67  Another commentator asserted that the bill and the 
activity surrounding it were a “revolution boiling up from the bottom.”68 
On March 30, it was clear that the bill would pass at least the Senate and 
potentially the House, although there were concerns among political leaders 
about its constitutionality in light of the fact that it included limitations on 
workers’ hours.69  The issue for FDR was that his administration was about 
to “find itself with a recovery program without having taken a hand in its 
formulation.”70  Indeed, it was a recovery program mostly created by the 
AFL in coordination with other parts of the labor movement and 
congressional leaders.  FDR “had not yet seriously considered the problem 
and did not know how he wanted to proceed.”71  He was “stung to action” 
when the bill passed the Senate.72  FDR worried about a constitutional 
showdown.73  And a showdown this would have been:  the Black bill was a 
direct challenge to the Supreme Court’s rulings about the unconstitutionality 
of state wage and hour laws, and the Court had struck down many such 
regulations as interfering with the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of 
liberty—here, the liberty of contract between employers and employees.74  
The federal law implicated not only substantive due process concerns but 
also the scope of Congress’s federal interstate Commerce Clause power. 
Instead of creating fixed standards on wages and hours, the administration 
proposed an alternative route suggested by Secretary of Labor Frances 
Perkins:  it sought to create a scale of wages and hours keyed to certain 
industries.75  The AFL indicated that it would support the bill if the bill would 
also guarantee workers the right to bargain collectively.76  Many industry 
leaders were deeply opposed to collective bargaining guarantees, but the 
 
 65. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 25–26. 
 66. Id. at 25 (quoting journalist Paul Anderson). 
 67. Id. 
 68. The commentator, Ernest K. Lindley, is quoted in ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE 
AGE OF ROOSEVELT:  THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 95 (1958). 
 69. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 25. 
 70. Id.  Perkins recounts, “When I talked with the President in April 1933 about the Black 
bill, his mind was as innocent as a child’s of any such program as [the] NRA.” FRANCES 
PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 189 (1946). 
 71. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 25. 
 72. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 56 (1963). 
 73. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 25; SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 95. 
 74. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 75. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 25–26.  For a history of support of voluntary codes, 
see SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 87–91. 
 76. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 26. 
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AFL would not back down.77  Despite industry’s protest, the AFL was able 
to negotiate with government leaders, and the House Labor Committee came 
out in unanimous support of the bill, which included a collective bargaining 
guarantee, “bowing fully to organized labor with respect to collective 
bargaining.”78 
Although the Black bill ultimately failed when the administration proposed 
the Recovery Act instead, seeking to commit industries to voluntary codes 
rather than national standards, the AFL had demonstrated its power and put 
a collective bargaining guarantee on the table.  To ensure the passage of the 
Recovery Act in the Senate, FDR had asked Senator Robert Wagner to form 
a committee to work on proposals.79  His committee and a drafting committee 
worked to produce a flexible bill that involved self-regulation of business 
under codes, which would be formed sector by sector and regulate workplace 
issues from hours to wages to child labor.80  After Felix Frankfurter 
recommended it, the committees also drafted the collective bargaining 
guarantee that had been promised during the Black bill deliberations in light 
of the “political strength of the AFL, as demonstrated by the Black bill.”81 
In May 1933, FDR sent the Recovery Act to Congress.82  The debate in 
Congress was focused on the collective bargaining right in section 7(a).  The 
AFL offered proposals to strengthen this provision by putting strong 
language in favor not only of protecting collective bargaining as a “right” but 
also of barring employer interference; the proposal was opposed by industry 
leaders.83  Ultimately, the AFL prevailed:  section 7(a) of the Act included a 
strong collective bargaining guarantee.84  It gave workers “the right to 
organize and bargain collectively” and prohibited employer interference with 
that right.85  As labor historian Irving Bernstein puts it, “The American 
Federation of Labor achieved in the Recovery Act, in one form or another, 
its leading legislative demands.  In addition to [section] 7(a), it won the 
prospect of shorter hours through codes and collective bargaining, as well as 
a public works program.”86  The New York Times reported that organized 
labor “has suddenly jumped into . . . sudden power.”87  As Bernstein notes, 
AFL President Green heralded section 7(a) as a “Magna Charta” for labor, 
and John Lewis of the UMW “compared it with the Emancipation 
Proclamation.”88 
 
 77. See id. at 26–27. 
 78. Id. at 27. 
 79. Id. at 27–30; see also LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 72, at 56–57. 
 80. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 27–30.  For an overview of the drafting process, see 
SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 96–98. 
 81. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 28–29. 
 82. See id. at 30–31. 
 83. See id. at 31–34. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. at 34. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (quoting William Green and John Lewis). 
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2.  The Path to the NLRA 
a.  Trying the Path of Persuasion 
The Recovery Act, and its assertion of workers’ right to bargain 
collectively, created great energy among workers, who began joining unions 
and organizing for labor rights.89  At the same time, the labor movement 
helped push to get industries under codes through the Blue Eagle Campaign.  
As historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., describes it, “Throughout the land 
merchants put the Blue Eagle in their windows and stamped it on their 
products” to show their support for the evolving labor regime and its sector-
by-sector codes of conduct.90  The public engagement surrounding the 
campaign was strong.91 
Parades celebrated it.  Speeches praised it. . . .  Over two million employers 
signed up.  Consumers signed a pledge of their own . . . . 
The climax came with the Blue Eagle parade in New York City . . . .  
In the greatest march in the city’s history, a quarter of a million men and 
women streamed down Fifth Avenue, while a million and a half more lined 
the streets, watching and cheering.92 
At the same time, the League—which had historically fought for wage and 
hour laws and is at the center of the FLSA story in Part IV—connected with 
the labor movement.  League leaders were shocked by how little public 
participation Hugh Johnson, the NRA administrator, brought to bear on 
drafting codes.  The League used public and intragovernmental channels to 
pressure him and industries and, in so doing, is credited with influencing the 
adoption of many labor codes.93  The “national surge around the Blue Eagle” 
that the League and the labor movement had sparked “helped break the log 
jam in Washington,” and “[d]raft codes began to pour in to NRA.”94 
b.  Strikes:  Act I 
There was a significant problem with the Recovery Act, however.  The 
collective bargaining guarantee in section 7(a) was being ignored.  The words 
of section 7(a) “expressed an intent,” “[b]ut they did not precisely define a 
policy.”95  Put another way:  “The meaning of 7a, in short, would be 
determined in large part not by the words of the [Recovery Act] but by the 
 
 89. See id. at 35–37; SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 139.  Unions gained incredible spikes 
in membership, which contributed to the labor movement’s common appeal. See, e.g., 
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 72, at 106–07. 
 90. SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 115. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Id.; see id. at 111–15; see also LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 72, at 66. 
 93. See SUSAN WARE, BEYOND SUFFRAGE:  WOMEN IN THE NEW DEAL 91 (1981); see also 
STORRS, supra note 28, at 96, 110–12. 
 94. SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 116. 
 95. Id. at 137; see also IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
POLICY 29–39 (1950). 
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pressures management and labor could bring to bear on the process of 
interpretation.”96  And so, as Schlesinger puts it: 
[E]mployers were losing no time in mounting a counteroffensive.  If the 
Recovery Act promised workers the right to organize, the law still remained 
vague about the form organization should take.  Many businessmen decided 
that the best way to meet the terms of the Act without unduly strengthening 
labor was to set up company unions.97 
Company unions were formed within a single plant or company.98  
Workers in them could not join with a broader independent union.  And union 
leaders had the tricky position of working within the plant:  “Men whose 
future was dependent on the employer across the table obviously could not 
put the labor case with the freedom of an outsider or with the technical skill 
of a professional.”99  Because of this, the company union became “an ideal 
instrument for any who sought to fulfill the letter and frustrate the spirit of 
the Recovery Act.”100  This was a disappointment for the labor movement.101 
The response to the problem was remarkable.  Workers from across the 
labor movement began to agitate and strike, and the “overriding issue in these 
disputes was the fundamental right to bargain collectively.  Workers formed 
unions and demanded recognition.”102  From steelworkers to newspaper 
workers, these strikes made national headlines and put wind in the sails of 
the movement.103  As Bernstein recounts it, “Man-days lost due to strikes, 
which had not exceeded 603,000 in any month in the first half of 1933, 
spurted to 1,375,000 in July and to 2,378,000 in August.”104 
The government, though, reacted with gradual measures, such as 
establishing the National Labor Board (NLB) to deal with these disputes, but 
it was then an ad hoc body without legal powers.105  It employed a common-
law approach to interpreting section 7(a), and its “authority and prestige were 
sapped in the latter part of 1933 by the fatal lack of a legal underpinning.”106  
Workers began refusing to appear before it, and similarly ad hoc revisions 
and changes were not sufficient.107  Strikes, sit-ins, and divisions within the 
automotive industry across the country raised the stakes of the issue as 
workers pushed for stronger guarantees of what they now considered in great 
numbers to be a fundamental right.108  A wave of protest was peaking. 
 
 96. SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 137. 
 97. Id. at 144. 
 98. Id.  See generally 1 JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD:  A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1974). 
 99. SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 144. 
 100. Id. at 145; see also TOMLINS, supra note 27, at 108–09. 
 101. SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 145; see also TOMLINS, supra note 27, at 108–09. 
 102. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 173; see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 144–45. 
 103. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 173. 
 104. Id. at 172–73. 
 105. Id. at 173–77. 
 106. Id. at 177. 
 107. Id. at 177–216; see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 148–49. 
 108. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 177–216; SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 385. 
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c.  NLRA:  Attempt I 
With the labor movement’s power at a seeming height, Senator Wagner, 
his advisors and team of lawyers, and various movements worked together 
to push for a stronger bill—one that would both guarantee workers the right 
to bargain collectively and better respond to and prevent employer 
interference. 
As deliberations began, congressional leaders maintained that the NLRA 
would enact new legislative rights of freedom.  When introducing the bill, 
Senator Wagner remarked, “Simple common sense tells us that a man does 
not possess this freedom when he bargains with those who control his source 
of livelihood.”109  He went on to argue that economic freedom could only be 
ensured through the security of collective bargaining.110  Worker self-
government, the Senate report that came out of the committee hearings 
declared, simply attempted to be true to “rights that were inherent in 
citizenship,” including the right “to be free to form or join organizations, to 
designate representatives, and to engage in concerted activities.”111 
One marker of the power of the labor movement in the legislative 
deliberations during 1934 was the extent to which members of Congress 
recognized the pressure of the movement and felt compelled to respond.  The 
preamble to the 1934 bill itself reflected this reality.  In one part it declared, 
“Inadequate recognition of the right of employees to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing has been one of the causes of 
strikes, lockouts, and similar manifestations of economic strife.”112  In a 
speech by Wagner to promote the bill, he continued this theme by citing the 
900,000 workers whose disputes came before the National Labor Board.113  
An article by Senator Wagner printed in the New York Times in March 1934 
and included in the Congressional Record continued this theme: 
Men versed in the tenets of freedom become restive when not allowed to 
be free.  The sharp outbreaks . . . in various parts of the country at the 
present time have been caused more by the failure of employers to observe 
the spirit of section 7(a) of the Recovery Act than by any other single 
factor.114 
The AFL President, William Green, continued this siren call in his 
testimony, where he recounted the efforts that workers had made in good 
faith to organize, only to be thwarted by management.115  Just before the 
Senate Committee on Labor issued its report, an automotive strike involving 
100,000 workers was averted, but the Committee did not forget:  its report 
stated that during their deliberations, the strike had been narrowly averted 
 
 109. 78 CONG. REC. 4230 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
 110. Id. 
 111. S. REP. NO. 73-1184, at 4 (1934). 
 112. S. 2926, 73d Cong. § 2 (1934). 
 113. 78 CONG. REC. 3678–79 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
 114. 78 CONG. REC. 4230 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
 115. S. REP. NO. 73-1184, at 69 (1934) (statement of William Green, President of the 
American Federation of Labor). 
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and that witnesses testified that “a majority” of the strikes were “caused by 
interference with the right of individuals to organize.”116 
On June 3, 1934, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor echoed 
the power of the movement.117  But debate did not go on long in the Senate 
before FDR proposed a substitute measure to keep the Recovery Act alive by 
strengthening the NLB’s enforcement power through enabling it to hold 
union elections.118  When Wagner took the floor, he agreed to support the 
president’s measure, arguing that it “may be a good thing to allow these 
reforms to encounter an additional period of trial and error, so that the 
processes of education and understanding may catch up with the social 
program that has been inaugurated.”119  Senator La Follette took a stronger 
tone.  He spoke of the “ominous signs of great unrest” in the country and 
reminded his fellow senators that strikes “are in progress in practically every 
section of the United States.”120  He urged that the bill be passed and the 
president’s measure defeated.  With these words in the air, the session closed 
and the president’s measure was passed. 
d.  Strikes:  Act II 
A flood of strikes proceeded—together they were “the great wave of 
strikes”121 of the “volcanic” summer of 1934.122  And the “right to organize 
was itself becoming the crucial issue” throughout these strikes.123  As 
Bernstein says, “In 1934 labor erupted.”124  “There were 1856 work 
stoppages involving 1,470,000 workers, by far the highest count in both 
categories in many years.”125  They included the “auto parts workers at the 
Electric Auto-Lite Company in Toledo, . . . truck drivers in Minneapolis, . . . 
longshoremen and then virtually the whole labor movement on the shores of 
San Francisco Bay, and . . . cotton-textile workers in New England and the 
South.”126  In order to push for the right of collective bargaining, there was 
the “growing conviction of many workers that they must now take matters 
into their own hands and demonstrate their collective power.”127 
The strikes have been credited with having impact.  As James Gray Pope 
states, the “great strike wave of 1934 provided the impetus for the Wagner 
Act and stiffened the Democrats’ determination to regulate the national 
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economy.”128  The strikes of the summer of 1934 died down by the time that 
the NLRA was going to be reconsidered in the spring of 1935, but the labor 
movement was sure to remind Congress and FDR of their nearness.  Pope 
describes the scene in detail, from John Lewis of the UMW ordering a 
national strike of 400,000 coal miners on the night that the Recovery Act 
expired, to the Philadelphia delegations from 400 unions preparing for a 
wave of strikes to defend section 7(a), to even the New York Central Trades 
and Labor Council raising “the spectre of a nationwide general strike.”129  
The various parts of the movement, in short, were interconnected and 
mobilized. 
3.  Debate and Passage 
As the Senate again considered the NLRA, the labor movement took center 
stage in legislative deliberations.  As Bernstein explains: 
[T]he bill was presented at the most favorable possible moment politically, 
for 1935 was the apogee of the New Deal as a domestic reform movement.  
The influence of labor was at its height and Senators who had little 
enthusiasm for [the Act] feared to face the AFL at the polls with a negative 
vote on their records.130 
It is worth noting the movement convergence during these hearings as well.  
Various parts of “the labor movement, industrial relations experts, [and] 
religious leaders” testified in support of the bill.131  The Wisconsinites and 
AALL—who are central to the social insurance battle discussed in Part III—
also strongly backed the bill, and Senator Wagner brought in Edwin Witte 
and William Leiserson, two students of John Commons, a University of 
Wisconsin professor who cofounded the AALL and created the Wisconsin 
school approach to social insurance, to help his staff continue drafting the 
bill.132 
Labor’s argument about economic freedom was present in the hearings and 
debates as well.  In committee hearings, where the “great debate over the 
Wagner Act took place,”133  Wagner spoke of bestowing upon the worker “a 
new freedom to grapple with the great economic challenges of our times.”134  
He also spoke of collective bargaining rights providing “emancipation from 
economic slavery and of an opportunity to walk the streets free men in fact 
as well as in name.”135  He continued this theme in his speech on the Senate 
floor, calling the NLRA “the next step in the logical unfolding of man’s 
eternal quest for freedom.”136  Aligning the NLRA with the American 
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Revolution, where political “despotism” was “cast off,” Wagner continued 
that “today, with economic problems occupying the center of the stage, we 
strive to liberate the common man from destitution, from insecurity, and from 
human exploitation.”137  The “isolated worker” was “[c]aught in the labyrinth 
of modern industrialism and dwarfed by the size of corporate enterprise,” and 
he could “attain freedom and dignity only by cooperation with others of his 
group.”138  The logic of the NLRA, as Wagner would put it in another 
instance, was therefore not only to ensure worker economic freedom but to 
protect our system of “democratic self-government” itself, for in an industrial 
nation of workers, worker freedom of association made the “difference 
between despotism and democracy.”139 
Congressman Truax, a leader in the House, continued this theme and used 
political concepts to anchor economic freedom.  He said, to wide applause, 
“Thomas Jefferson said:  ‘If the Constitution is not right let us amend it.’  I 
say that again that day has arrived.”140  He then called the NLRA a “new bill 
of rights, a new declaration of independence, if you please.”141  He continued, 
“[This] is an emancipation for American labor.  As Lincoln freed the blacks 
in the South, so the Wagner-Connery bill frees the industrial slaves of this 
country from the further tyranny and oppression of their overlords of 
wealth.”142 
Senator Wagner also testified to the power of the labor movement.  
Wagner referred to the recent strikes, and he also outlined how nearly three-
quarters of them were based on workers arguing in principle for the right to 
bargain collectively.143  Wagner concluded that bolstering the right to 
bargain collectively needed to be Congress’s path.144 
The Senate Committee on Labor reported unanimously in the bill’s favor 
on May 2, 1935, with the Senate report noting the labor movement’s activism 
and power.145  Indeed, a few days before, the AFL had put together a 
conference with over 400 representatives in attendance to support the bill, at 
which Senator David Walsh, chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor, spoke.146  At the same time, the AFL remained in 
contact with members of Congress and continued to negotiate on key items.  
AFL President William Green testified in favor of the enactment of the 
NLRA, and Wagner’s team of lawyers “constantly consulted [the AFL] and 
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received many suggestions through its counsel, Charlton Ogburn.”147  The 
AFL also pushed Frances Biddle, the chairman of the NLRB, to include a 
provision in the bill stating employers’ duty to bargain “explicitly in view of 
the pressing problem of union recognition under 7(a).”148 
On May 15, 1935, Wagner took the bill to the floor.  After short debate, 
the bill passed the Senate the next day by a vote of 63-12.  Only four 
Democrats and eight Republicans voted against it.  At the same time, FDR 
consulted with labor leaders, including Green from the AFL, Hillman from 
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA), Lewis from the 
UMW, as well as Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, and decided to support 
the bill.149 
Momentum was building for the passage of the bill when, on May 27, the 
Supreme Court decided A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,150 
which struck down title I of the Recovery Act.151  Wagner and his colleagues 
were planning to replace the Recovery Act with the NLRA, but the ruling 
increased doubts about the NLRA’s constitutionality.  The Court found that 
the portion of the Recovery Act at issue was unconstitutional because the 
business activity in question only had an “indirect effect” on interstate 
commerce.152  In moving forward, Wagner would distinguish the NLRA 
from the Recovery Act.  Wagner argued that the NLRA related to 
“employment conditions related to goods that are intended for subsequent 
interstate shipment or that are in the flow of commerce” and thus directly 
affected interstate commerce.153  FDR threw his support more 
wholeheartedly behind the measure, calling the Court’s decision a “horse and 
buggy” view of interstate commerce and comparing the decision to Dred 
Scott.154 
The House proceeded with its deliberations, and the House report 
reiterated the strength of the labor movement.155  Deliberation, too, continued 
with unions.  Senator Wagner addressed the Executive Council of the 
Teamsters and assured them that the bill would not harm craft unions.156  
Unresolved issues remained, and they demonstrate the movement 
interlinkage and the movement interlinkage and conflict that can sometimes 
occur.  The AFL sided with Secretary Frances Perkins on housing the new 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) within the Department of Labor.157  
The League worked strenuously to get the Act passed, but it thought that the 
NLRB should be an independent agency and engaged in deliberations with 
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House leaders on this issue.158  The House ultimately adopted the League’s 
position, and the Senate agreed.159  The Act passed the Senate easily on June 
19, 1935, without a roll call, and passed the House on June 27 also without a 
roll call. 
The NLRA, among other things, provided workers the right to bargain 
collectively and to engage in collective action for mutual aid and protection, 
and indeed encouraged these features.  It also set in place an administrative 
structure—the NLRB—to enforce that right.  Even those representatives who 
worried about the constitutionality of the bill preferred to “gain labor’s 
political support” and leave the outcome in the hands of the Supreme Court—
a fact that testifies to the power of the movement.160  FDR signed the Act 
into law on July 5, 1935, giving pens to Senator Wagner and AFL President 
Green.161 
III.  THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1935 
This Part focuses on the role of a movement of mostly elderly citizens, the 
Townsendites, and a group of academics, the Wisconsinites, who formed a 
core part of the AALL,162 in pressuring for and drafting the Social Security 
Act of 1935, which provided for federal unemployment insurance, old-age 
insurance, and benefits for the blind, disabled, and dependent children.  This 
Part explores how they tied economic freedom to collective security through 
social insurance, and then looks at their role in passing the legislation. 
A caveat:  Many groups were behind the push for social security during 
the wave of mobilization, and many of them were integral to producing the 
Social Security Act of 1935.163  Some accounts focus mostly on other groups, 
and I reference them here.164  The Townsendites and the Wisconsinites, 
however, had direct and cognizable roles in shaping the law that was 
produced.  The Townsend movement, although it favored old-age pensions 
rather than social security, exerted enough external pressure to get old-age 
guarantees onto the agenda and into a proposed congressional bill.  At the 
same time, because the administration and Congress were unsure of the final 
form of a social security bill, they integrated members of the AALL, with the 
Wisconsinites leading it, into an ad hoc committee that would propose 
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architecture for the bill and draft major portions of it.  The combination of 
Townsendite pressure and Wisconsinite expertise would be key ingredients 
in the making of the Social Security Act of 1935. 
A.  Movement Development 
At the level of policy, the Townsendites and Wisconsinites would differ.  
But each movement considered it to be a right for older Americans to have 
security in their old age.  This point became especially salient after the Great 
Depression.  The notion of an agricultural life, surrounded by family to take 
care of one upon retirement, was fading.165  Just before the Great Depression, 
Dr. Abraham Epstein estimated in 1928 that “30 per cent of the aged sixty-
five years and over were dependent on others for support.”166  With the Great 
Depression, things worsened.167  In 1930, the dependent old-aged rose to 40 
percent of those sixty-five and older and, by 1935, to 50 percent.168 
1.  The Wisconsinites and the AALL 
John R. Commons, a founder of the AALL and the leader of its Wisconsin 
school, was a student of Richard T. Ely at Johns Hopkins University and had 
been influenced by him to study social insurance programs that would protect 
injured and disabled workers, the unemployed, and the aged who could no 
longer work.169  Commons began to advocate for these programs.  He worked 
with veterans, attempting to procure them pensions, and began to discuss the 
need for pensions and other forms of social insurance with scholars and 
workers’ movements.170 
At Wisconsin, Commons began regular Friday evening conversations—
affectionately called “Friday Niters”—where he, students, and other 
professors would discuss issues surrounding social security.171  Commons, 
with his peers, turned to fighting in Wisconsin for compensation for 
workplace injuries and deaths.172  He struck up a friendship with the more 
conservative Yale professor Henry W. Farnam, and they united on issues 
surrounding worker security.173  Commons, along with Farnam and Ely, 
started the AALL—focusing on the right to unionize, on minimum wages, 
and on worker security and insurance—with only twenty-three members, 
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most of whom were friends of Commons.174  In a few years, it grew to over 
3000 members, with leading lights such as Louis Brandeis and Jane Addams 
on its roster.175 
The Wisconsinites, through the AALL, campaigned for state legislation 
for workers.  It was auspicious that Commons would come to the University 
of Wisconsin when progressive Robert La Follette became governor and 
controlled both houses of the legislature.176  Commons and his colleagues 
drafted and worked with legislators to put into law the nation’s first workers’ 
compensation law in 1911 in Wisconsin.177  It was upheld in the courts and 
drew the attention of a young man, Arthur Altmeyer, then working in a small 
law firm.178  Altmeyer enrolled in the University of Wisconsin and within 
little time was integrated into the Friday Niters.179  He was joined by a young 
Edwin Witte.180  Together with Commons and Farnam, they helped craft and 
pass workers’ compensation statutes in thirty states by 1915.181  For years 
after, they focused on state-provided health insurance, but to no avail.182  By 
1920, Witte and Altmeyer were in Wisconsin state government, and the 
AALL refocused its attention on unemployment and old-age security, with 
little success.183 
Together, in living rooms and in conferences, the Wisconsinites and the 
AALL formed a vision of freedom based on collective security.  As early as 
1909, the proceedings of the AALL’s annual meeting show a merging of its 
proposed legislation with fundamental constitutional commitments.  A 
transcription in the publication of its 1908 proceedings speaks of the 
insecurity born of the losses incurred by both the workers—who lose their 
lives or ability to work—and their families, who suffer as well.184  The 
publication tied social insurance to liberty, saying that social insurance and 
workers’ legislation would be in keeping with the “view of the founders of 
the Republic,” who designed the Constitution to “secure the blessings of 
liberty.”185 
By the next year, the AALL’s journal spoke of the legislature as being 
“bound to the observance of certain fundamental principles of individual 
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right” to critique those courts which stand in the way of workers’ 
legislation.186  Later in the same volume, social legislation—including 
collective bargaining guarantees, old-age insurance, workers’ compensation 
insurance, and onward—was situated in its constitutional context:  “Social 
legislation” laid down a “new rule [that] must become a part of our 
constitution.”187  The essay continued that the forms of social insurance and 
protection sought were not only constitutional, but a “constitutional 
necessity” to secure the purposes of the Constitution and make self-
government function.188  These forms were “positively constitutional,” 
which means that “[t]hey both modernize and vitalize these honored phrases 
and the constitution is given a new and larger life.”189  The essay concluded 
by bringing the Wisconsinite vision full circle:  “So a new meaning is given 
to the constitution.  The way is open for it to do for twentieth century 
civilization what it has done for nineteenth century civilization.”190 
2.  The Townsendites 
Years later, after the advent of the Great Depression, Dr. Frances E. 
Townsend of Long Beach, California, was sixty-six years old when he was 
forced into retirement without savings.191  He began to formulate an idea, 
which appeared in its first form in the Long Beach Press-Telegram on 
September 30, 1933, for the federal government to offer every person age 
sixty or older a pension of $200 per month.192  This was a “princely sum in 
the 1930’s.”193  Ever creative, Townsend also required that each recipient 
spend the entire amount within thirty days.194 
Within a few weeks of Townsend writing the letter, a full page of the 
Telegram was dedicated to debate over the plan, and Townsend’s personal 
residence was being stormed by neighbors wanting to discuss it.195  They 
formed clubs in Long Beach and soon across the nation.196  The clubs had 
regional and national conventions, which were a mixture of deliberation and 
mass protest.197 
From the beginning, the Townsend movement stressed the need for a 
national system of old-age policy.198  The initial local petitions in California 
called upon Congress to act, and the petitions thereafter frequently had their 
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eyes set on the national stage.199  Equally important, the club’s membership 
was largely composed of persons who had worked all of their lives and 
viewed their right to a pension as emanating from that fact.  These were 
workers who could no longer work and who felt that their years of toil 
entitled them to basic security.200 
Within two years after the initial Townsend Club was chartered, there were 
7000 clubs with approximately one and a half million participants.201  
Already, in some congressional districts, not supporting the Townsend plan 
meant defeat.202  When a Townsend bill was introduced in the House in 1934, 
nearly two hundred congressmen absented from the vote.203 
The right to old-age security was for Townsendites something 
fundamental, something any “aging citizen should be entitled to.”204  And 
this is why they brought their message about old-age security as a “right.”205  
The Townsendites felt that the stakes could not be higher.  Indeed, the 
movement believed that the persistence of democratic government itself was 
at stake:  “We truly believe that if such a vigorous fight is not prosecuted 
with all seriousness and resistance, we may expect to see our democratic form 
of government pass; not only from this country but from the face of the earth 
during this generation.”206  Economic security was, for them, imperative for 
a thriving democracy. 
B.  Passing the Statute 
During the New Deal, both movements knew that influence would have to 
run through the national lawmaking process, and the lawmaking process was 
not exactly trending in either movement’s direction as much as they had 
hoped with FDR’s election.  FDR supported old-age insurance and had 
agreed before his inauguration to explore methods for establishing it, often 
gesturing toward state or federal-state programs.207  And he had intended to 
support such programs even earlier.208  But little was forthcoming.  The 
Wagner-Lewis bill of 1934, which FDR encouraged, dealt only with 
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unemployment insurance.  As one historian puts it, “Apparently the President 
had not contemplated asking for old-age insurance at that time.”209 
1.  The Push for Old-Age Security 
But 1934 was an election year for Congress, and the Townsend movement 
was employing pressure.210  Signatures on petitions for old-age security 
“mounted by the hundreds of thousands.”211  The press reported the 
movement’s membership to be as few as 300,000 people and as many as 
4,000,000.212  The Townsend clubs bombarded newspapers, senators, and the 
White House with “carloads of letters.”213 
As a result, Frances Perkins remarked that adding old-age insurance to the 
Wagner-Lewis bill became “politically almost essential.”214  Perkins 
continued, years later in her memoir, “One hardly realizes nowadays how 
strong was the sentiment in favor of the Townsend Plan . . . .  The pressure 
from its advocates was intense.”215  She added that, as a result, FDR “began 
telling people he was in favor of adding old-age insurance clauses to the bill 
and putting it through as one program.”216 
2.  The Wisconsinites in Government 
FDR composed the Committee on Economic Security (CES) in 1934 to 
look into drafting a better bill in large part to respond to the Townsend 
movement’s pressure.217  FDR also did so to be responsive to the wave of 
mobilization around the issue of social insurance more generally, including 
Senator Huey Long’s “share the wealth” movement and other social 
insurance organizations such as the American Association for Social 
Security.218  FDR wanted a proposal for a bill from the CES by January, five 
months after he signed the executive order creating it, and a draft plan for it 
by December 1.  And here is where the story of the two movements 
converges:  the Townsendites levied the pressure that helped to create the 
CES, and the Wisconsinites were integrated into the CES as a result of their 
expertise and in the CES would play a leading role in the deliberations to 
devise the architecture of social security.  In this way, the Townsendites 
received formal recognition as voices for the old-aged, while the AALL and 
Wisconsinites were recognized for their expertise in designing social 
insurance systems. 
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Labor Secretary Perkins brought in members of the AALL, and the 
Wisconsinites took center stage.  First, she brought in Altmeyer to implement 
the executive order, and Altmeyer brought in Witte to serve as executive 
director.219  As a research assistant, Witte brought in Wilbur Cohen, a student 
of Witte’s and another regular Friday Niter.220  They also brought in Barbara 
Armstrong, the first female law professor in the United States, who had 
written a comparative global treatise on social security and insurance 
programs.221  She had also been involved with various social security 
movements and had developed social insurance policies in California and 
other areas of the United States.222  The advisory council, apart from the staff 
members, included members of the labor movement, various worker security 
movements, as well as participants from industry.223 
3.  Townsendite Pressure 
The wave of connected movements knocking at the door of the CES 
continued to swell.  The president had provided for an additional advisory 
council of five, but there were over 150 experts that the White House thought 
ought to be included in deliberations.224  As a result, they convened a national 
conference and invited well over a hundred of these experts and activists.  
The keynote speakers were an antipoverty activist doctor, Isaac Rubinow, 
and Abraham Epstein, who led the American Association for Social 
Security.225  Witte and Armstrong were asked by Perkins to write an initial 
report outlining “the problem” for the CES in advance of the conference.226  
Witte was sensitive to FDR’s hesitancy about old-age insurance and thus 
focused more on unemployment insurance.227  To test the waters at the 
conference, and in response to concerns over the constitutionality of old-age 
insurance, FDR decided not to make it a centerpiece of the conference.228 
Next, the Townsend movement came back into play in an important way.  
As the conference was starting at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., 
FDR retreated on old-age insurance.  Mentions of it were gone in the list of 
discussion topics in the program and an address from FDR at the White 
House that day yielded this message:  “On some points it is possible to be 
definite.  Unemployment insurance will be in the program . . . .  I do not 
know whether this is the time for any Federal legislation on old-age 
security.”229 
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Once again, the Townsend movement rose to action.  “[They] reacted 
immediately and vociferously.  Letters, phone calls, and telegrams poured 
into the White House.”230  Before long Perkins was on the phone with FDR, 
who had left to vacation in Warm Springs, to explain the pressure being 
levied by the Townsendites.  FDR bent and asked Perkins to issue a press 
release affirming the president’s strong support for old-age insurance.231 
To further assuage the Townsendites, FDR gave a written address days 
later to the National Conference of Mayors in which he strongly asserted that 
old-age insurance would be included in his recommendations to Congress.232  
Thus, as FDR moved back, the Townsend movement pushed him, and 
ultimately old-age insurance, forward.  The “urgency of the issue, reflected 
in the election of Townsend congressmen and the mounting public demand 
which the Townsend Plan spearheaded, could not be ignored.”233  In 
addressing the CES after the conference, FDR thus said this of old-age 
insurance: 
We have to have it . . . .  The Congress can’t stand the pressure of the 
Townsend Plan unless we have a real old-age insurance system, nor can I 
face the country without having devised at this time . . . a solid plan which 
will give some assurance to old people of systematic assistance upon 
retirement.234 
4.  Debate and Passage 
The ball was back in the CES’s court.  With a clear consensus around 
making old-age and unemployment insurance part of the bill, it was a 
question of how to do it and how to pass it.235  This was what the 
Wisconsinites in the CES toiled over.  Numerous proposals were floated for 
programs, and numerous interpretations about the costs and benefits were 
swirling around.236  Information overload set in and it was not long before 
the president’s December 1 deadline passed and the CES had not come to 
make its recommendation.237  Perkins ordered the CES to stay over 
Christmas week to hammer out a proposal.238 
A federal plan to provide a tax-offset scheme to states for unemployment 
was led by Witte, with support from Perkins and Roosevelt.239  Witte also 
pushed for a contributory plan for old-age insurance, a more federally led 
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program than unemployment insurance.240  The Wisconsinites also 
supported programs for the elderly in need, dependent children, and the 
blind.241  And Grace Abbott, a former League and AALL member who now 
ran the Children’s Bureau, had an outsize role in designing programs for 
dependent children, and according to Witte, later played a critical role in 
convincing the Ways and Means Committee to push forward with the bill 
when its members were wavering.242  In these ways, the League and AALL 
were in constant negotiation with lawmakers.  Even the AFL “did everything 
it could” to help pass the SSA.243 
The CES turned these recommendations over to Congress, with no 
knowledge of their fate.  Concessions were made, including the removal of 
agricultural and domestic workers from old-age and unemployment 
insurance systems, a compromise made for senators from the South and to 
the detriment of many working blacks and women.244  This would be a 
limitation of the bill for some time.245  Apart from this limit, the bill was “in 
its general design, consistent with the work that had emerged from the 
Committee on Economic Security.”246  The Act both provided federal grants 
to states that gave relief to the unemployed, needy, and to children, and 
mandated payroll taxes for employers and employees to provide insurance 
for unemployment and old age. 
In the short legislative deliberations in 1935, Congress picked up on the 
argument made by the movements, touting social insurance as both a right 
and as fostering economic freedom through providing security.  Sounding in 
the Wisconsinites’ register, Senator Wagner, one of the sponsors in the 
Senate, called social security a matter of right and heralded in a “new era of 
well being in which the social inequalities of the past will be driven forever 
from the scene.”247  Senator Alben Barkley also conceived of social security 
as a fundamental right, and sounding in the Townsendites’ register, argued 
that it stemmed from government’s “duty . . . to its aged and to its 
unemployed and to its indigent.”248 
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Senator Nathan Bachman spoke of social security in promoting the 
“economic independence” of citizens, which in turn allows the citizen to be 
an “agent for his Government.”249  He continued that “American democracy 
can be preserved only” by ensuring this kind of economic security.250  
Similarly, Congressman Robert Doughton stated that Congress was 
“fashioning the foundation stones upon which will rest the happiness and 
welfare of future generations” by enacting “social reforms that are necessary 
to preserve our economic and political institutions.”251  And Congressman J. 
William Ditter spoke of the constitutional responsibility to protect the 
“economic security” of citizens and stated that he was “persuaded that the 
recognition of this responsibility by the civic and industrial leaders will help 
to protect our traditional American institutions of freedom and personal 
liberty by the correlation of the needed economic security.”252  Congressman 
William Sirovich further argued that only after economic security is achieved 
can one turn to being a citizen.253 
The House passed the bill on April 19, 1935, by a vote of 372-33.  The 
Senate passed the bill by a vote of 77-9 on June 19, and conference proceeded 
through July, with voice votes on August 8 in the House and August 9 in the 
Senate.  FDR signed the bill on August 14 and provided a pen to a leader of 
the Fraternal Order of the Eagles, a gesture to the fact that even conservative 
organizations and movements supported the Act. 
C.  FDR and the Supreme Court Weigh In 
As FDR campaigned for reelection in 1936, which he would win in a 
landslide, he focused on economic security.  FDR’s acceptance speech for 
the Democratic Party’s nomination took place in Philadelphia.  Over 100,000 
people gathered to hear a speech that Senator Wagner had helped to draft.  In 
the speech, FDR argued that “political freedom” must also extend to prohibit 
“economic slavery,” that the “right to work” was no less central to citizenship 
than “the right to vote,” and that the very liberty of democracy is not safe 
otherwise.254 
FDR continued, “For too many of us the political equality we once had 
won was meaningless in the face of economic inequality. . . .  For too many 
of us life was no longer free; liberty no longer real; men could no longer 
follow the pursuit of happiness.”255  He proclaimed, “Today we stand 
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committed to the proposition that freedom is no half-and-half affair.  If the 
average citizen is guaranteed equal opportunity in the polling place, he must 
have equal opportunity in the market place.”256  As he put the argument in 
an address on Labor Day, “The Fourth of July commemorates our political 
freedom—a freedom which without economic freedom is meaningless 
indeed.  Labor Day symbolizes our determination to achieve an economic 
freedom for the average man which will give his political freedom reality.”257 
After the election, in 1937, the Supreme Court would have the opportunity 
to weigh the constitutionality of the statutes.  In each case, the Court 
described workers and their insecurity as the national government’s focus, 
which reflected the shift in emphasis from employer-employee freedom of 
contract that had animated its substantive due process cases.  In upholding 
the NLRA on interstate commerce grounds in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp.,258 the Court referred to workers’ “fundamental right” to “self-
organization.”259  The Court focused on the conditions faced by workers that 
made this right necessary, noting that workers were often “helpless in dealing 
with . . . employer[s]” and that employees relied on wages to maintain their 
lives and their families—all of which made it “essential to give laborers 
opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer.”260  In another sign 
of movement convergence, the Wisconsinites played a role in the case.  After 
the NLRA was passed, Wagner called in David Saposs, another former 
Commons student and Wisconsinite AALL member, to develop evidence on 
how labor issues and strikes affected interstate commerce.261  Finally, in 
upholding the taxation and old-age insurance provisions of the SSA in 
Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis262 and Helvering v. Davis263 on, 
respectively, interstate commerce grounds and general welfare grounds,264 
the Court spoke of the insecurity born of the problems of unemployment and 
poverty, the inability of states to provide adequate relief, and Congress’s 
judgment of the necessity of acting in favor of the general welfare to address 
a national problem.265 
IV.  THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 
This Part explores the enactment of the FLSA, which, for workers in 
interstate commerce, provided for a federal minimum wage, instituted 
overtime pay requirements, and prohibited child labor, among other things.  
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The Part focuses first on the League.  It explores the League’s arguments 
about economic freedom and shows how it was integral to the generation of 
a national conversation on wages and hours.  It then explores the campaign 
of pressure that the League launched to get the Act out of the House Rules 
Committee, which had been holding it hostage for months.  Throughout these 
efforts, the League worked with and linked to other movements.  The League 
also integrated members into government, where they played important roles.  
This Part focuses, finally, on the labor movement and traces its influence on 
the evolution and passage of the FLSA. 
A.  Movement Development 
Before becoming Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins had long been 
committed to workers’ rights and safety.  As an employee of the League in 
the early days of the twentieth century, Perkins demanded legislative action 
after a fire at the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory in New York City in 1911, 
where 150 young girls died, “suffocating . . . behind locked doors, or leaping, 
screaming, to the streets below.”266  When the New York State Legislature 
set up an investigatory committee and put her on it, she took political leaders 
to see young girls “up at dawn . . . snipping beans and shelling peas” at other 
factories and alerted the leaders to the length of their hours, the paucity of 
their wages, and the dangerousness of their conditions.267  Perkins and the 
League believed that collective bargaining was not enough alone to prevent 
these problems.268  As Schlesinger notes, “It was from these middle-class 
groups . . . that the first demand came for the abolition of child labor, for 
maximum-hour and minimum-wage laws, and for social insurance.”269  They 
brought to their representatives, said Senator Wagner, “the insistent problems 
of modern-day life.”270 
Though the League formed in New York City in 1891 as the Consumers’ 
League, it became the National Consumers’ League in 1899.271  From then 
through 1932, it was led by Florence Kelley.  In discussing the work of the 
League, Kelley liked to tell others what her father had told her:  “My 
generation has created industry, your generation must humanize it.”272  The 
League’s motto was:  “Investigation, education and legislation.”273  By 1916, 
the League claimed to have 15,000 members in forty-three states.274  It 
included on its rosters figures from Louis Brandeis to Eleanor Roosevelt.275  
As the League’s General Secretary until Lucy Mason took over upon her 
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death, “Kelley masterminded the movement that by 1917 produced 
maximum hours laws for women in most states and minimum wage laws for 
women in a dozen states.”276 
Like all of the movements explored here, the League believed that it was 
fighting for fundamental rights for workers.  They spoke, when opposing 
child labor, of “the right to childhood.”277  Florence Kelley wrote that the 
“right follows from the existence of the Republic”278 because children who 
enjoy childhood rather than the doldrums of work become “enlightened self-
governing citizens.”279  In arguing for shorter working hours and sufficient 
wages, Kelley said that without leisure, limits on hours, and living wages, 
“manhood becomes ignoble and unworthy of citizenship in the Republic.”280  
The right to leisure, then, “is required to undo the damage wrought in the 
working-hours, if the worker is to remain fit for citizenship in the 
Republic.”281  Thus, the League came to believe that “equal rights in 
citizenship” in the political sphere were “meaningless” without “social and 
economic freedom.”282  Wage and hour laws and those banning child labor 
were rights in “process of recognition” through the legislative process.283 
B.  Passing the Statute 
The League’s membership declined during the 1920s, when policymakers 
and presidents fostered an increasingly hostile environment to wage and hour 
laws,284 but would resurge in the 1930s when it pushed harder for wage and 
hour laws and put together large conferences of experts to discuss their 
formulation.285  Quite a few members—including Frances Perkins, Eleanor 
Roosevelt, and Grace Abbott—were integrated into inner echelons of state 
and national politics by the 1930s.286  Among the movements considered 
here, the League had the highest degree of inclusion within government 
structures.  And agitation by the League had helped to produce some of the 
institutional configurations within federal government that would be 
essential to the future success of workers’ rights:  the Children’s Bureau in 
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1912, the Women’s Bureau in 1920, and the Division of Labor Standards in 
1934.287 
1.  New Deal Networks 
By 1932, Florence Kelley had passed away, and Lucy Mason took the 
helm of the League.288  The League began lobbying the Senate for hearings 
on a potential bill and authorized Molly Dewson, who was close to FDR and 
Eleanor Roosevelt, to explore with them routes to national legislation on 
wages and hours.289  In these early processes of deliberation and consultation, 
the League and its allies harnessed the citizens involved from their state 
struggles to fight for a national policy.  Indeed, while the Recovery Act was 
still in its “gestational stage, Secretary of Labor Perkins proposed a national 
wage-hour law based directly on the [League]’s model state bill.”290 
At the same time, the League strengthened its networks, which would 
become important to its success in the years ahead.  It “drew on local 
women’s groups, female-employing unions, settlement houses, church 
groups, and labor departments” and was “behind the passage of six minimum 
wage laws for women in 1933.”291  During this time, the League would also 
shape labor leaders who would later be important to generating the FLSA.  
John Lewis, who would later lead the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO), which split away from the AFL at the end of 1935, and Sidney 
Hillman, who would lead the ACWA, were influenced by the League to take 
positions in favor of national wage and hour laws when the labor movement 
was still largely skeptical of such government policies.292  Hillman had been 
mentored by Frances Perkins and promoted by her when he worked in New 
York State government, and Lewis had been influenced by League member 
Josephine Roche, who owned a coal-mining company that had treated 
Lewis’s union well.293  These leaders’ experiences with the League have 
been credited with shaping their evolution toward supporting national wage 
and hour legislation.294 
2.  The Path to the FLSA 
A national policy would be difficult to enact.  Court rulings striking down 
wage and hour laws on freedom-of-contract grounds continued, although 
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they were increasingly unpopular.  By 1936, when the Court overturned yet 
another minimum wage law on freedom-of-contract grounds in Morehead v. 
New York ex rel. Tipaldo,295 “it alienated nearly everybody.”296  As 
Schlesigner notes, “It was even too much for Herbert Hoover.”297 
The Court would change direction not long after.  The institution of these 
standards was vindicated in the 1937 case West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,298 
which upheld a 1913 Washington State minimum wage law for women.299  
Chief Justice Charles Hughes, writing for the majority, defended the 
minimum wage as protecting the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, a 
“liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against 
the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the 
people.”300  The Court’s ruling in Parrish, as well as its upholding of the 
Wagner Act and Social Security Act, also gave the movement hope in 
national policy.  After Parrish, at FDR’s prodding, Frances Perkins asked 
administration lawyer Ben Cohen to turn his attention to the wage and hour 
bill that she had “locked away in a desk drawer.”301  The bill he worked on 
was based on a bill he had drafted before with the League, and he put his 
energy into reworking it.302 
As the bill was introduced in Congress on May 24, 1937, President 
Roosevelt sent a letter imploring members of Congress to think of the 
relationship between democracy and economic security—the one he had laid 
out clearly as he campaigned for reelection in 1936.  FDR stated that a third 
of the nation was “ill-nourished, ill-clad and ill-housed” and that a “self-
supporting and self-respecting democracy can plead no justification for the 
existence of child labor, no economic reason for chiseling workers’ wages or 
stretching workers’ hours.”303 
a.  Courting Labor 
In the meantime, in mid-May 1937, FDR turned his attention to 
deliberating and negotiating with labor leaders.  The AFL had been a leading 
force at the outset of the New Deal in producing the Black thirty-hour bill.  
Many forces within the labor movement had by then come around to national 
regulation on hours.  However, the AFL still worried that minimum wages 
would become maximum wages, and while its leadership still supported 
some type of wage program, it was not predisposed to put too much power 
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in a federal administrative structure.304  AFL leaders wanted to ensure that 
the form of the law did not undermine its purposes and even sought to exempt 
unionized workplaces from legislation.305 
Others were less concerned.  John Lewis of the CIO was much more 
supportive of the measures that were forthcoming.306  Hillman, president of 
the ACWA, was also supportive of the measures and had worked with 
Perkins in drafting similar legislation at the state level.  Given labor’s 
splintering, FDR called in the president of the AFL, William Green, 
separately from Hillman and Lewis.307  With each, he discussed his hopes 
for the labor standards bill.  They were all supportive of a program to some 
degree, but the details of that program were yet to be hammered out.308 
b.  Getting Child Labor into the Act 
Cohen and other lawyers worked hard on the bill.  An early draft was 
produced without child labor prohibitions.  Before the bill was sent to 
Congress, it was a League member and former chief of the Children’s Bureau 
(which, as noted above, was put in place in large part due to the League’s 
efforts309) who consulted with government officials and also ensured that the 
child labor provisions were put into the Act.  As Frances Perkins recounted 
the episode: 
One last minute change was the insertion of a clause prohibiting the labor 
of youngsters under sixteen in industries engaged in interstate commerce 
or affecting interstate commerce, and providing for not more than eight 
hours of work a day for children over sixteen.  As Grace Abbott, [former] 
Chief of the Children’s Bureau, so eloquently pleaded, “You are hoping 
that you have found a way around the Supreme Court.  If you have, why 
not give children the benefit by attaching a child labor clause to this bill?”  
The President readily agreed and was delighted that we might make this 
bill cover child labor as well as low wages and long hours.310 
Abbott had been integrated into government as a result of her work with the 
League, and although she had retired from government in 1934, she was 
instrumental in making sure that one of the League’s central commitments 
made it into the bill. 
c.  Getting the Act out of Committee 
When the now-polished bill based on the League’s model made it to 
Congress, the League, now led by Mary Dublin, mobilized people across the 
country and lobbied broadly in D.C.  The labor movement, though, would 
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initially not be so enthusiastic.  When the bill first came before Congress, the 
testimonies of Lewis, Hillman, and Green were mixed.311  They continued to 
support the bill in principle but all testified in favor of amendments that, to 
their minds, would best realize the aims of the bill by ensuring that minimum 
wages did not become both floors and ceilings, among other things.312 
The bill left committee, and after some back-and-forth and a few months 
of recess, a version of the bill was able to pass the Senate, only to linger in 
the House.  Southern conservatives on the House Rules Committee held up 
the bill, refusing to release it to the floor.313  While the bill floundered there, 
the AFL amped up its criticism and the House Labor Committee proposed 
another bill.314  By the spring of 1938, the House Rules Committee was still 
stonewalling the bill.315 
To put pressure on the Rules Committee, the League mobilized middle-
class Americans in the South, both within the League and from its 
collaborative allies, where conservative congressmen faced strong employer 
resistance to the bill.316  The League used “southern voters to apply pressure 
from home on anti-FLSA politicians.”317  Other unions lobbying for the bill 
were not able to find this pressure point, but the League’s leader, then Mary 
Dublin, knew to target Southern Democrats on the House Rules Committee.  
Dublin “sent dozens of wires like this cryptic one” to Lucy Mason in Atlanta:  
“Rules Committee deadlocked 7-7—extremely urgent you wire Rep. Cox [D-
GA] now opposing sending wage-hour bill to floor vital persuade others 
influence do likewise.”318  The League’s network of Southern women 
“signed resolutions to be read into the congressional record” and wrote 
editorials in Southern papers supporting the bill.319  They also went into local 
chapters of the League of Women Voters and other women’s groups to garner 
support for the bill.320 
Through exerting pressure like this, the League has been credited with 
generating enough pressure in the South to help move conservative members 
of Congress and get the bill out of committee.321  Indeed, largely as a result 
of the League’s efforts, in the spring of 1938, “southerners demonstrated 
sufficient enthusiasm for the FLSA in surveys and at the polls to trigger a 
shift in congressional attitudes.”322  The League had also helped the cause of 
those few Southerners supporting the measure.  Claude Pepper of Florida and 
 
 311. Id. at 257–58. 
 312. Id. 
 313. See id. at 260. 
 314. See id. 
 315. STORRS, supra note 28, at 193–95. 
 316. See id. at 188–89. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 189. 
 319. See id. 
 320. See id. at 194. 
 321. Id. at 154; see also DEBORAH M. FIGART, ELLEN MUTARI & MARILYN POWER, LIVING 
WAGES, EQUAL WAGES:  GENDER AND LABOR MARKET POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 104–
05 (2005). 
 322. STORRS, supra note 28, at 189, 335–36. 
1498 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
Lister Hill of Alabama were criticized even for their lukewarm support of the 
bill, only to surprisingly win their renominations for the upcoming election 
with “spectacular majorities” mobilized by the League and its sister 
movements; this effort contributed to the tide change in favor of the bill.323 
Thereafter, the League’s National Labor Standards Committee “obtained 
thousands of signed resolutions supporting the [FLSA] from individuals 
around the country.”324  League members mobilized:  speaking on the radio, 
writing in newspapers, calling labor committees in states across the country, 
and helping to mobilize “the middle-class, intellectuals, churches, [and] 
women’s organizations.”325  Convinced that “it is not labor alone which 
speaks for itself” but rather the “leaders of the community in every walk of 
life,” the League sought and achieved great support from many 
movements.326  The League convinced the Young Women’s Christian 
Association (YWCA), the National Council of Jewish Women, and the 
League of Women Shoppers to endorse the bill.  They joined with the 
ACWA, International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU), and CIO 
in “flood[ing]” legislators with telegrams and producing opinion pieces 
signed by “hundreds of ‘leading citizens.’”327 
d.  Courting Labor, Again 
With public momentum building, the White House then focused on labor.  
In January of 1938, Perkins had called in a young lawyer, Rufus Poole, who 
went out and explored the different objections labor leaders had to the bill 
and worked to negotiate with them.328  In coordination with Poole and others, 
the AFL began to come around.329  As Perkins recounted, negotiations made 
it clear that the White House would need to better understand, and move 
toward, the AFL’s position in terms of simplifying the bill.  “Congressman 
Griswold of Indiana drafted a bill which was said to have originated in the 
[AFL] Council.  This simply established a forty-hour work-week and a forty-
cent minimum wage in all industries.”330  The AFL bill also got rid of the 
complex administrative structure and gave courts the ability to hold 
responsible those who deviated from the bill.331 
Given the time that the Rules Committee had freed up, a subcommittee in 
the House Labor Committee was formulated to make the bill a possibility 
from the AFL’s perspective.332  Through its deliberations, the committee 
mostly kept to the AFL’s plan, though it added in its draft the establishment 
of wage boards that would fix wages and hours gradually so as to reach the 
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forty-hour week.333  This bill, named the Ramspeck bill, was then opposed 
by the AFL because it did not favor the wage board; conversely, it was 
supported by the CIO, which further exacerbated the still-existing problem 
of conservative Southern Democrats, who were deeply opposed to the 
CIO.334 
Mary Norton, chairwoman of the House Committee on Labor, then 
decided to “present a bill along the lines of the one offered by the [AFL].”335  
The bill came out of the House Labor Committee favorably, on a vote of 
14-4, on April 21, 1938, but, as explored above, the Rules Committee was 
not yet budging, and by a vote of 8-6, did not release the bill to the floor.336  
When the Rules Committee did ultimately let the bill out of committee, both 
the conservative Southerners and the AFL were on board.  On May 23, the 
bill was sent to the floor. 
3.  Debate and Passage 
On May 23, debate began on the House floor.  Congressman Edward 
Curley of the House Labor Committee argued that the legislation would 
provide Americans the “security which the Constitution of the United States 
of America provides for,” linking constitutional commitment and economic 
security.337  Echoing Florence Kelley’s comments on how the lack of 
economic security from high wages saps citizens of their self-governing 
qualities, Congressman Maury Maverick picked up the republican argument 
and said that low wages had drained workers of their “spirit of independence” 
and had made them “docile.”338  He urged for the passage of the bill, arguing 
on behalf of “upstanding, courageous Americans demanding all their 
rights.”339 
Congressman William Fitzgerald spoke of the bill as protecting 
fundamental rights.  He argued, “The wage and hour bill is an honest and 
sincere effort to meet and not to avoid the just demands of the workingman 
that his fundamental rights be observed.”340  To applause, Congressman 
Sirovich spoke of the economic order that the bill was a part of and echoed 
the League’s vision of a civilized capitalism based on firm economic rights 
of citizenship.341  Channeling Kelley, he said that the bill aimed to “humanize 
our economic order.”342  He continued that a worker with economic security 
is “sober-minded” and “patriotic.”343  Again connecting political and 
economic themes, he said that the bill would deliver on the “promissory note” 
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of the Declaration of Independence, which set up “a system of minimal 
equality, extending into political, economic, and social realms.”344  The bill 
passed the House by a vote of 313 to 97.345 
The Senate and House bills now had to be reconciled.  When the Senate 
and House conferees discussed the bill, there was large divergence between 
them.  In short, the Senate bill did not contain the same extent of national 
standards on wages and hours.346  Ultimately, the Southerners “yielded, and 
the conference agreed upon national standards.”347  A single administrator 
advised by the industries committees was chosen to set the basic standards of 
wages and hours to placate the AFL, and the Wage and Hour Division was 
created.348  A final compromise was to move the hour regulation from forty 
to forty-four hours.349  Like the Social Security Act, however, the formation 
of the FLSA suffered from built-in exclusions, such as the exclusion for 
agricultural workers, which “meant the omission of more than 50 percent of 
southern black employees, men and women, from coverage.”350 
The FLSA was adopted by the House and Senate on June 14, 1938.351  The 
Act applied to workers in interstate commerce and prohibited employing 
minors, established a national minimum wage, and ensured the payment of 
overtime for hours worked over forty-four hours per week.  Reflecting on the 
FLSA, Perkins predicted that the Act would “be a permanent part of the legal 
structure and economic pattern of the United States.”352  But it had to clear a 
final hurdle:  the Supreme Court.  The Court upheld the FLSA on interstate 
commerce grounds in United States v. Darby Lumber Co.,353 in which the 
Court repeatedly referred to “substandard labor conditions” that were 
“injurious” to commerce and to workers.354  The Court stated that Congress 
“is free to exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states for 
which they are destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, 
morals or welfare.”355 
V.  INTERPRETATION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Thus far, this Article has presented the related histories of the NLRA, SSA, 
and FLSA.  The previous three Parts focused on an overlapping set of social 
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movements behind the push for each statute, their engagements with 
legislators and officials, and their arguments about the purposes of the 
statutes.  In this Part, I draw out the constitutional purposes of the statutes as 
a set at a more general level and explore how they together responded to the 
problems industrialism posed to the Republic by redefining economic 
freedom around worker security.  I also argue that they qualify as “small c” 
constitutional commitments, or “super-statutes.”  I briefly explore some 
implications of this argument for how courts generally interpret the statutes. 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that this Part does not focus on the 
history of how political, social, and economic developments and judicial 
review have interacted with, and in some cases weakened, these 
commitments in the past few decades.  This history has been well chronicled 
elsewhere and still remains to be fully chronicled,356 but this Article’s most 
useful contribution is reframing the foundations and constitutional 
significance of the statutes and offering some thoughts about how that 
reframing can shape present debates. 
A.  Constitutional Purposes of the Statutes 
This Article began in Part I with a description of the rise of an industrial 
order that movements and political leaders believed subjected citizens to 
degrees of economic insecurity that were incompatible with our 
constitutional system.  In this section, I explore how the statutes together 
articulated a novel definition of economic freedom in the sphere of work—
freedom as worker security—to remedy this problem. 
In each statutory history, the movements and lawmakers made arguments 
about how providing economic freedom as security357 through these statutes 
would produce citizens capable of participating in constitutional self-
government.358  In each statutory history, movements and legislative leaders 
elaborated this theme and argued that workers would gain the security of 
better working conditions from collective action, that social insurance would 
diminish insecurity resulting from temporary or permanent work stoppages, 
and that wage and hour laws would prevent workers from falling into the 
insecurity of poverty.359  And in each history, these figures connected 
security both to freedom and citizenship.360  New Deal leaders thus sought, 
as FDR put it, an “economic freedom” that made “political freedom [a] 
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reality.”361  Without economic freedom as security, workers would be 
enmeshed in webs of dependence and suffer wage, workplace, and 
unemployment conditions that would result in systemic insecurity, which 
would sap them of the self-governing qualities the constitutional republic 
requires.  This is why, in the words of the Wisconsinites, “social legislation” 
for workers needed to become “part of our constitution.”362 
The passage of these statutes transformed the American idea of economic 
freedom and its relationship to political freedom.  While the founding 
conception linked economic freedom as entrepreneurial “independence” to 
political freedom,363 to speak of independence in an era of worker 
interdependence and corporate managerial governance would have been 
inapt.  Citizens had become enmeshed in forms of workplace governance 
rather than agrarian isolation as the wage earner replaced the citizen-
entrepreneur.  As Part I explored, the constitutional concern of the 
movements and lawmakers was that industrialism had impaired or destroyed 
the balance between economic and political freedom as workers became 
increasingly unable to effectively bargain with their employers, secure wage 
and hour limitations that provided them with independence from the 
workplace, and endure insecurity as work stopped temporarily or 
permanently. 
Restoring conditions of economic freedom by providing workers with 
security was essential to making industrialism compatible with our 
constitutional republic.  As historian Eric Foner explains: 
Like the Civil War, the New Deal recast the idea of freedom by linking it 
to the expanding power of the national state.  But now, economic security, 
not the civil and political rights of the former slaves and their descendants, 
dominated discussions of freedom.  “Our democracy,” wrote John A. Ryan, 
“finds itself . . . in a new age where not political freedom but social and 
industrial freedom is the most insistent cry.”364 
However, exploring the arguments of the movements and lawmakers 
pushing for these statutes and placing them in their historical light shows that 
the redefinition of economic freedom around security is best understood in 
terms of its relationship to political freedom in the constitutional order:  
economic security in a country of workers produced citizens who could 
participate in constitutional self-government—that is, who could exercise 
political liberty.365  Economic and political freedom remained intimately 
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connected, but the former took on a new gloss.  To read these statutes as a 
set, then, is to speak of how they were focused on redefining economic 
freedom around security in order to fill the hole that the Industrial Revolution 
tore in the constitutional order.  The freedom and security of workers as a 
group took center stage in the American constitutional system. 
B.  The Statutes as Super-Statutes 
The statutes are not only a set connected by their purposes; they are also a 
set of “small c” constitutional commitments.  William Eskridge and John 
Ferejohn’s A Republic of Statutes describes a deliberative process through 
which statutes become “super-statutes” that exist as part of our constitutional 
framework and provides wide-ranging examples of how super-statutes have 
been constructed and entrenched.366  A super-statute “emerges after a lengthy 
period of public discussion and official deliberation” and becomes 
entrenched after an even longer post-enactment period of interpretation, 
amendment, and consensus-building.367 
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue at length that the Social Security Act has 
become embedded in the “small c” constitution and, in previous work, 
identified the NLRA as a super-statute in passing, but their account is silent 
on the connection between the statutes.368  However, Eskridge and Ferejohn 
generally theorize that statutes may be related in their histories and purposes.  
For example, they argue that there is a “national security constitution” and a 
“green constitution,” each composed of a set of statutes.369  There is similarly 
a “workers’ constitution” composed of the NLRA, SSA, and FLSA. 
While my argument in this section focuses on post-enactment 
entrenchment, it is worth pausing briefly to emphasize the ways in which 
social movements played important roles in the initial legislative processes.  
Eskridge and Ferejohn principally focus on social movements’ role in setting 
the legislative agenda,370 after which the main actors in their account tend to 
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be legislators, executive branch officials, and courts,371 whose deliberation 
and consensus-building entrench the statute in the constitutional fabric.372  
Social movement theorists focus on how movements can be involved not 
only in agenda-setting but in later parts of the legislative process, including 
content-specifying, drafting, and aiding passage.373  In the histories of the 
New Deal statutes above, this was precisely what happened.  The statutes 
studied here were the product of a decades-long struggle to accommodate the 
American constitutional order with corporate and industrial capitalism, and 
the focus above on the exchanges and deliberations between movements and 
lawmakers throughout the legislative process deepens the deliberative pool 
from which to draw in establishing the statutes’ entrenchment.374 
The central roles citizens played in the enactment of the statutes may even 
be constitutionally significant.  American constitutional politics since its 
inception has been conceptualized as a process whereby the people “take 
power into their own hands” and mobilize to participate in making new 
fundamental commitments.375  The fact that social movements were central 
actors in the legislative processes of the New Deal contributes to those 
statutes attaining “small c” constitutional status because it involves the 
people themselves in the deliberative process.376  This Article’s bottom-up 
account of New Deal legislative constitutionalism better reveals the various 
forms of deliberation and engagement which build the consensus that 
entrenches the statutes.  Indeed, while the post-enactment histories of the 
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statutes are illuminating and central to qualifying them as super-statutes 
under Eskridge and Ferejohn’s framework, arguably the most sustained and 
serious forms of deliberation took place in the years and decades leading up 
to their enactment because the statutes transformed the American idea of 
economic freedom and the federal government’s role in securing it. 
1.  The NLRA 
While the history leading up to the enactment of the NLRA provides a 
remarkable example of the labor movement’s vision of economic freedom 
and of a years-long battle over the right of workers to bargain collectively as 
an expression of that freedom, post-enactment entrenchment is central to a 
statute becoming a super-statute.377 
The NLRA qualifies under all of the criteria that Eskridge and Ferejohn 
focus on:  deliberation through legislative and administrative expansion of 
the statute, bipartisan support for the statute, and the interweaving of the 
statute into the constitutional fabric.378  First, the NLRA received further 
legislative deliberation.  While it survived conservative amendments in 
1939,379 the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 aimed to protect employer 
free speech, encouraged “free choice” in collective bargaining, and 
prohibited unions from discriminating against employees who did not wish 
to bargain.380  While the Taft-Hartley amendments shifted some of the power 
back to employers and have been subject to intense criticism,381 they did not 
vitiate the core right of workers to bargain collectively and, from a 
deliberative standpoint, arguably made that right more palatable to 
conservatives.  In addition, and perhaps more importantly, in the decade 
before the Taft-Hartley amendments, unionization rates quadrupled from 
about 3.6 million workers to 14.3 million workers,382 and in the decade after 
its passage, the union density levels remained at about 35 percent of the 
working population and remained there through the 1970s.383 
Second, the NLRA’s administrative structure grew and evolved.  The 
NLRB withstood conservative challenge in 1940 and its structure changed 
through legislative deliberation and administrative experimentation.  As 
regional directors were given more authority, the NLRB took on complex 
economic functions, and the Office of the General Counsel was created to 
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cordon off judicial and prosecutorial operations.384  In addition, the 
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 specified union election and reporting 
mechanisms, building out the administrative information-gathering functions 
of the NLRB.385 
Third, the Act was supported by presidents of both major parties over time.  
Truman supported collective bargaining rights to the extent of vetoing the 
Taft-Hartley amendments, which were passed over his veto, and Eisenhower, 
as the first Republican president after FDR, supported the collective 
bargaining rights of employees as well.386  That support continued over 
succeeding decades.387 
And, finally, while the past thirty years have seen a decline in labor 
organizing for a variety of reasons, including employer efforts to limit the 
scope of collective bargaining, globalization, and the transition to a service 
economy,388 the notion of a “right” of workers to bargain collectively is stuck 
in constitutional culture, and indeed it has been heralded by the Supreme 
Court as a “fundamental right.”389  The recent attack on public sector unions 
has further weakened organized labor as a force,390 but public sector unions 
were not part of the NLRA, none of the attacks go to the rights of workers to 
organize and bargain, but instead chip around them, and even these efforts 
are opposed by large supermajorities of citizens.391  While these are serious 
threats to labor organizing, no national politician could at this time succeed 
on a platform of taking away from workers the right to bargain collectively.  
Indeed, the SSA survives as a super-statute under Eskridge and Ferejohn’s 
account even though a president sought to privatize the system, although his 
administration’s ultimate failure to do so contributes to the notion that the 
“small c” right is difficult to dis-entrench.392  Recent major national 
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legislative proposals seek to make it easier for employees to exercise their 
right to bargain.393 
At the same time, there is no doubt that the statute as a mechanism for 
encouraging or facilitating worker organization has weaknesses.394  And 
while the ossification or weakening of super-statutes over time is a problem 
for any account of legislative constitutionalism—one I turn to in the 
Conclusion—it speaks to the question of how to keep the statute functioning 
well over time once it is entrenched and not whether it has become 
entrenched through deliberation and consensus.  That is, the question of 
whether a legal norm is entrenched so it has achieved constitutional or quasi-
constitutional status is separate from the question of whether the institutional 
mechanisms operationalizing that commitment need to be revitalized at a 
later point in time—here, some eighty years later.  Undoubtedly, they do at 
this point.  And the ways in which citizens struggle to easily exercise that 
right, and the ways in which movements are trying to attack that problem by 
reshaping the structure of unions, are deeply important.  But for present 
purposes, the more important point is, as Cass Sunstein puts it, that “the right 
to join a labor union is so deeply ingrained that its elimination would require 
a large-scale change in public judgments.”395 
2.  The SSA 
Eskridge and Ferejohn have argued at length that the SSA is a super-
statute, but it is worth summarizing their claim here.  While their account of 
the process of passing the statute focuses more on different movements, as I 
referenced above, and deviates from mine in this regard, their account of 
post-enactment entrenchment is generally accurate. 
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that the SSA has “become a successfully 
entrenched super statute” in part because “its norm of federally guaranteed 
old-age insurance has stuck in our political culture more firmly than many 
Constitutional norms.”396  And although the “Social Security Act was not 
immediately internalized in the political culture,” it became so over time 
“through an arduous process of successful administration, statutory 
amendment, and bipartisan commissions.”397  Eskridge and Ferejohn 
therefore provide an overview of the path of deliberation leading to the 
limited Act of 1935; the 1939 amendments expanding its coverage and 
congressional deliberation surrounding them; how the SSA then went 
through administrative deliberation and survived Republican attack as 
President Truman supported the program; how Congress then reaffirmed it 
and expanded coverage into the 1950s; and how it was supported through 
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GOP control of the presidency with Eisenhower, and continued expanding 
and flourishing through that decade and those to come.398  Each of these 
forms of contestation, debate, and deliberation led to the SSA becoming 
further entrenched in the national consciousness until it became a super-
statute. 
3.  The FLSA 
The FLSA has also become entrenched as a super-statute through 
deliberation and elaboration.  The Act was extended and modified over the 
twenty years after its passage in a spate of legislative deliberation.  Congress 
passed the 1947 Portal-to-Portal Act to clarify what constituted compensable 
work time.399  In 1949, Congress passed an amendment, which, among other 
things, increased minimum wages and strengthened the child labor 
prohibitions.400  The Act was similarly amended in 1955 and 1961 to raise 
the minimum wage.401  The Equal Pay Act of 1963 extended the FLSA’s 
provisions to make it illegal to pay workers less on the basis of their sex.402  
A 1966 amendment raised the minimum wage and included farm workers in 
the Act’s provisions.403  The Act has been amended several times since.404 
In addition, the Act’s administrator—the Wage and Hour Division—has 
grown to cover more administrative functions:  for example, the Division 
acquired the ability to sue on behalf of employees for back wages and to 
regulate wages and hours with regard to other laws, including the Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993.405  Finally, the Act was also supported by 
Truman406 and Eisenhower,407 who were both in favor of raising the 
minimum wage.  While some amendments to the Act in recent years have 
limited it by, for example, reclassifying “exempt” employees,408 the concepts 
of prohibition on child labor, minimum wages, and overtime pay are central 
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to the American political culture and indeed are the roots of increased 
activism and democratic activity.409 
C.  Interpreting the Statutes 
The NLRA, SSA, and FLSA are connected by the wave of movements that 
fought for them, by their redefinition of economic freedom around worker 
security, and by their settlement into the constitutional fabric as super-
statutes.  The account of these statutes I have offered thus far deviates from 
the conventional account of the New Deal transformation.  That account is 
focused on the federal government—with FDR at the helm—seeking to pass 
economic legislation, including labor and employment legislation, that would 
expand the federal government’s regulatory power over the economy.  This 
commenced a battle that, after a long struggle, was resolved when the 
judiciary acquiesced or evolved on its own with regard to the constitutionality 
of federal economic legislation. 
The focus on constitutional permissibility not only obscures from view the 
affirmative constitutional purposes and status of the statutes.  It also 
potentially affects how courts interpret the statutes.  Eskridge and Ferejohn, 
for example, argue that courts should interpret super-statutes “broadly and 
evolutively” to implement “statutory purpose and principle as well as 
compromises suggested by statutory texts.”410  That means that the 
underlying constitutional purposes of the statutes matter, as does fulfilling 
those purposes under inevitably changing conditions.  I share with other 
scholars some concerns about what it means to interpret a statute “broadly” 
or “evolutively.”411  I am less concerned with “purposive” interpretation 
because the form is well-established in judicial practice and normatively 
defensible.  But since I have argued that the statutes qualify as super-statutes, 
and indeed as a set of super-statutes, it is worth considering what work both 
more purposive or “evolutive and broad” interpretation of the statutes could 
do. 
Consider the NLRA.  Courts have understood its underlying purposes 
differently over the years.412  Brishen Rogers has identified three concepts of 
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union freedom of association that courts have employed in interpreting it.413  
One is a “social democratic” concept that focuses on worker freedom of 
association and links economic freedom to political freedom.414  The social 
democratic concept is faithful to the purposes of the NLRA that this Article 
has elaborated.  The NLRA is embedded in a set of statutes designed to 
redefine economic freedom around security for workers and tie worker 
security to citizenship.  That is, the history of the “workers’ constitution” 
both reveals the constitutional purposes of worker freedom of association and 
embeds worker freedom of association in a larger constitutional 
transformation connecting economic and political freedom. 
Rogers explores, however, how the Supreme Court has moved from 
employing the social democratic concept in interpreting the NLRA and 
toward both civil libertarian415 and neoliberal416 interpretations of the statute.  
Each is increasingly individualistic and removed from the statute’s 
underlying purposes.  Rogers argues that what is at stake in the distinction in 
many cases is the vitality and strength of unions and, indeed, of the NLRA 
itself.  For example, he argues that the neoliberal concept would allow 
free riders to opt out of paying union dues while receiving the benefits of 
union representation, an issue the Supreme Court recently confronted with 
regard to public sector unions.417  This approach could potentially cripple 
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unions that would have to represent free riders without collecting necessary 
dues from them for the union to function and be effective.  Rogers defends 
the social democratic vision from the vantage of liberal political theory.  But 
this Article engages with both the constitutional struggle leading to the 
statute’s enactment and frames its larger constitutional purposes.  It offers 
historical reasons to call into question the extent to which judges are reading 
civil libertarian and neoliberal economic theories—which deviate from the 
purposes of the NLRA—atop the statute.418 
The Article’s framing of the purposes and context of the NLRA may also 
be useful in other circumstances.  For example, a broader purposive reading 
of the NLRA would support the notion that unions have a collective action 
right under section 7 of the statute to join together to litigate or arbitrate for 
mutual aid and protection.419  Also, scholars have argued that the Supreme 
Court’s expansive body of precedent allowing employers to permanently 
replace striking employees has made the right to strike enshrined in the 
NLRA inoperable, and an evolutive approach to interpreting the statute might 
push against these decisions for undermining the statute’s purposes.420  
Finally, a deeper understanding of the NLRA’s purposes could support 
reading the statute to allow for minority unions, which are formed without a 
majority of a workforce agreeing to be represented by a union421—a reading 
that could help to revitalize labor law in an era where fashioning majority 
unions is increasingly difficult because of employer advantages and tactics, 
many of which are sanctioned by courts.422 
Consider one other important example.  The weakening of the NLRA has 
been produced in part by judicial decisions making it difficult for workers to 
bargain with companies that are increasingly organized in layers of subunits 
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and subcontracts.  Corporations have adopted “fissured” corporate structures 
to make unionization difficult423 and to “diminish the potency of the NLRA 
and employment law.”424  This approach is useful in thwarting organizing 
insofar as the NLRA is interpreted as requiring workers to garner support to 
bargain with one single employer.425  As employers have “disintegrated” into 
webs of contracts and subunits, bargaining has also “disintegrated into 
single-division or single-facility units.”426 
This diffusion makes it difficult for workers to bargain in myriad ways.427  
To take one example that Kate Andrias draws out, the fast food workers 
behind the “Fight for $15” have recognized the “futility of holding 
[unionization] elections at McDonald’s franchise stores on a one-off basis” 
and “ha[ve] sought to define McDonald’s as the joint employer of all 
McDonald’s employees.”428  They have therefore attempted “to move 
responsibility for bargaining and liability up the supply chain.”429 
These efforts turn on how joint employers who can be responsible for 
bargaining with employers are understood under the NLRA.  While the Third 
Circuit and the NLRB initially interpreted “joint employers” somewhat 
broadly, which made it easier for workers in fissured workplaces to bargain 
with the company atop the fissured firm, in the past few decades the NLRB 
changed positions and required an entity to “exercise direct, immediate, and 
actual control over the terms and conditions of employment before the entity 
would be considered a joint employer.”430  This interpretation of the NLRA 
made it “exceedingly difficult for workers to hold liable an entity that 
retaliated against them for organizing, unless that entity was their immediate 
employer.”431 
The Board reversed that position during the Obama administration and 
returned to the more flexible previous position adopted by the Third Circuit, 
but now is considering going back to its previous, more rigid view of what 
constitutes a joint employer through rulemaking.432  Viewing the NLRA as 
in light of its constitutional purposes and as a super-statute helps to justify 
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the Board’s earlier approach, which turns on a purposive and evolutive 
reading of the NLRA.433  The narrowing of the joint employment standard, 
the Obama Board found, was untrue to the purposes of the NLRA and failed 
to make it functional under evolving conditions; it failed to “effectuate the 
purposes of the Act . . . in the current economic landscape” in which firms 
have fissured.434  Construing the NLRA otherwise would be “increasingly 
out of step with changing economic circumstances, particularly the recent 
dramatic growth in contingent employment relationships” and “potentially 
undermines the core protections of the Act for the employees impacted by 
these economic changes.”435 
The Obama Board also recognized, as the Supreme Court had in the past, 
the need to take an evolutive approach that would “adapt the Act to the 
changing patterns of industrial life.”436  It thus held that “two or more 
statutory employers are joint employers of the same statutory employees if 
they ‘share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and 
conditions of employment.’”437  This holding was consistent with the 
NLRA’s definition of “employer” and the common-law standards that aid in 
interpreting it.438 
The fight to reinstate the previous joint employment standards reflects the 
labor movement’s “aspiration to negotiate employment standards on 
industrial, sectoral, and regional levels, rather than at the level of the 
individual employer or even the individual supply chain.”439  The labor 
movement aims to make the collective bargaining promised by the NLRA 
more feasible in a changing economic world.  Their fight shows how a 
narrow reading of the NLRA can have damaging effects for workers in the 
modern economy and contribute to the decline of unionism. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the rise of the New Deal worker security 
provisions both in their original context and in terms of their modern 
constitutional significance.  I have argued that a wave of mobilization was 
behind the passage of the NLRA, SSA, and FLSA, and that the statutes are 
best understood as a set of “small c” constitutional commitments designed to 
redefine economic freedom around worker security. 
This history bears on how we conceive of the promise and limitations of 
the statutes in a new era of economic constitutionalism.  Americans now 
inhabit a “Second Gilded Age.”440  It is one characterized by increasing 
levels of economic inequality and insecurity, as well as the ossification of 
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many of the laws of economic security.441  In response, movements are 
making new claims for redefined rights to collective action, wage 
protections, and new forms of social insurance and economic protection.442  
Scholars have rightly characterized their efforts as a form of “small c” 
constitutionalism since they seek to make the revitalized economic security 
provisions “part of the deep normative commitments that define Americans 
as a political community.”443 
Part of this Article’s contribution is to reset the baseline by arguing that 
the economic security provisions for workers have been interconnected parts 
of the nation’s deep normative commitments.  Indeed, scholars note that one 
goal of movements today is to “breathe new life into ossified super-statutes 
of the past” by reforming labor rights, social insurance, and raising wages.444  
Part of this Article’s work has been to show that these federal laws both are 
super-statutes and should be understood as a complementary set. 
At the same time, even with the statutes formally in place, a new era of 
worker insecurity has arisen in part because legislators, courts, and 
administrators have fallen short on making the statutes workable under 
changing conditions.  Today’s ossification suggests that it would also be 
unwise to think that the formal entrenchment of a super-statute marks a sort 
of end, that super-statutes retain their “small c” constitutional status in 
enduring, perhaps even permanent, ways that are significant to citizens.  The 
reality is that citizens, legislators, courts, and administrators must play an 
ongoing role in the continued interpretation and vitalization of these regimes.  
To tell the worker who faces countless obstacles in exercising collective 
action that the NLRA is a super-statute offers cold comfort. 
Yet, like the individual workers who come together to exercise mutual aid 
and protection, the power of the New Deal super-statutes is augmented by 
their connection.  Together, they offer a foundational model of Americans 
reinterpreting their constitutional principles in light of changing social and 
economic structure.  They ground the idea of economic freedom as security 
as an important foundation of our modern constitutional history.  This idea 
runs through and connects the statutes, reveals itself as a constitutive norm 
that both binds the statutes and is shared over time by the broad wave of 
citizens, legislators, and executive branch officials who made and entrenched 
them. 
In one sense, then, this Article offers a tale of lost opportunity, a failure of 
courts, legislators, and executive officials in recent history to appreciate the 
constitutional edifice, to elaborate and honor it.  But, in another sense, 
revealing the “workers’ constitution” fused in our constitutional architecture 
raises the burden for those who seek to dismantle it and raises the floor for 
those who seek to revitalize it. 
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